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Sentencing law fails to provide judges with the tools necessary to prevent
anticipated and unjustified harm to prisoners. Judges can foresee that certain
individuals—often because of their mental or physical disabilities, sexual
orientation, or diminutive size1—will experience serious physical abuse or
mental injury while imprisoned.2 Currently, concerned judges may call these
offenders’ susceptibilities to harm or anticipated special needs to the attention
of correctional officials or suggest certain housing or treatment in prison through
their sentencing orders.3 However, these findings and recommendations are
non-binding, and officials may not even notify judges when they choose to
disregard such requests.4 Judges presently lack the authority to order any
condition of confinement, or to prevent the imposition of a particular condition,
even if they believe a condition is critical to the humaneness of an offender’s
carceral sentence or to the effectuation of its objectives. This Article builds the
case for granting judges that authority within the context of one vulnerable
population of prisoners: those with major mental disorders.5
Prisons are overwhelmed with inmates with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
and other serious mental illnesses, conditions that leave inmates poorly equipped
to navigate these dangerous environments.6 The hazards that seriously
1. See 28 C.F.R. § 115.41 (2013) (identifying risk factors for sexual assault in prison, which
include mental illness; physical or developmental disability; youth; diminutive size; a history of
victimization; first, nonviolent, or sexual offender status; and perception as gay, bisexual,
transgender, or gender-nonconforming); see also NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N,
NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 7–8, 69–74 (2009), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf (discussing risk factors).
2. See E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental
Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 181–82 & nn.172–75 (2013); Adam J. Kolber, The
Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 188–89 & n.11 (2009).
3. See infra notes 181, 302–06 and accompanying text (discussing the types of
recommendations judges may make for vulnerable defendants).
4. See ALLAN ELLIS ET AL., FEDERAL PRISON GUIDEBOOK 27 (2012); see also infra note
305 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency with which Federal Bureau of Prisons
officials adopt judicial recommendations).
5. See infra note 19 and accompanying text (defining the population at issue).
6. See HOLLY HILLS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EFFECTIVE PRISON MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES 2–3 (2004), available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/018604.pdf. Experts estimate
that around sixteen percent of prisoners have a mental disorder. Id. at 3; Kenneth Adams & Joseph
Ferrandino, Managing Mentally Ill Inmates in Prisons, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 913, 913 (2008).
This rate exceeds the incidence of mental disorder within the non-incarcerated community. DORIS
J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON
AND JAIL INMATES 3 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf
(reporting that around eleven percent of individuals age eighteen or older in the general population
of the United States satisfies DSM-IV criteria for symptoms of a mental health disorder). Because
male prisoners constitute ninety-three percent of the prisoner population in the United States, this
Article will focus on male prisoners. See HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PRISONERS IN 2009, at 2 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.
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disordered inmates face are numerous and substantial.7 For instance,
correctional officials may fail to detect an inmate’s disorder8 or treat it
effectively.9 Prisons typically house mentally ill offenders within the general
prison population, where they are especially likely to suffer physical and sexual
victimization.10 For disciplinary or protective reasons, correctional officials are
disproportionately likely to transfer disordered inmates to solitary confinement,
where they often experience serious psychological deterioration and acute
distress.11 These foreseeable harms may undermine the purposes of an
offender’s punishment and render his sentence disproportionate or even
inhumane.
Cognizant of this reality, a number of jurisdictions factor offender
vulnerability—a term used by this Article to include both substantial risks of
serious harm and a need for treatment or protection—into sentencing to a limited
extent. A handful of jurisdictions permit judges to commit certain individuals
for mental health treatment in lieu of imprisonment.12 A larger number of states
allow trial courts to depart from presumptive sentences when offenders require
specialized treatment or would face excessive hardship in prison.13 Many of
these jurisdictions permit a finding of vulnerability to support a stayed sentence
of incarceration with probation,14 while others authorize a reduction in the
duration of an offender’s carceral term upon a vulnerability determination.15
These efforts are laudable. However, they do not provide adequate relief for
vulnerable offenders sentenced to imprisonment because they fail to authorize
judges to alter an inmate’s likely conditions of confinement.
7. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 181–82 & nn.172–75. This Article focuses on individuals
with serious mental illnesses who are sentenced to prison. However, a defendant’s mental disorder
may not be his only source of vulnerability to serious harm in prison. See supra note 1 (identifying
other sources of vulnerability). Any additional risk factors should also factor into a sentencing
calculus to ensure that sentences are humane, proportionate, and serve the intended aims of
punishment.
8. See infra Part I.B. (discussing the shortcomings of mental health evaluation procedures in
prisons).
9. See infra Part I.C. (surveying and evaluating mental health treatment procedures in
prisons).
10. See infra notes 88, 95 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part III.A. (analyzing these jurisdictions).
13. See infra Part III.B. Specific authorization to factor vulnerability into sentencing is most
critical in jurisdictions that limit sentencing judges’ discretion. About half of all states employ
indeterminate sentencing schemes that allow for wide judicial discretion, while the remaining
jurisdictions limit judges’ abilities to vary sentences according to offender characteristics through
sentencing guidelines or a statutory determinate sentencing regime. See Kevin Reitz, The
“Traditional” Indeterminate Sentencing Model, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS 270, 270–71 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012).
14. See infra notes 195–97 and accompanying text (discussing these jurisdictions).
15. See infra notes 199–202 and accompanying text (discussing these jurisdictions).
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To address that concern, this Article extends these statutory frameworks to the
carceral context. In particular, it advocates for authorizing judges to tailor the
conditions of confinement for seriously disordered, vulnerable offenders. With
that authority, judges could design sentences to meet the needs of mentally ill
prisoners, obviate unjustifiable hardships, and, hopefully, reduce the extent to
which their disorders exacerbate the severity of their prison experiences. The
Article considers a number of tailoring options that each affect correctional
affairs to a different degree and offer unique efficiency benefits.
In arguing for an expansion of sentencing authority over conditions of
confinement, this Article contributes to the ongoing conversation in the
scholarly literature concerning whether and how sentencing should respond to
foreseeable but unintended harm. The author’s previous work has supported the
efforts of Professor Adam Kolber and others, who have theorized that just
punishment must consider foreseeable harm to offenders.16 One effective
critique of those efforts has been the practical observation that recognizing
susceptibility to harm in sentencing would entail giving lesser punishments (i.e.,
shorter carceral sentences) to sensitive, but equally culpable, offenders, which
would undermine the value of parity in punishment and the predictability of the
sentencing process.17 This Article suggests an alternative means of accounting
for vulnerability that would avoid that pitfall: give equally culpable offenders
the same basic punishment (i.e., terms of incarceration of the same duration),
but tailor the sentences of vulnerable prisoners to remove the unacceptable
hardships that flow from each individual’s disability.18

16. See Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 3–4 (2012)
(arguing for a “justification-symmetry principle,” whereby state actors must justify harm purposely,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently caused in the name of just punishment); see also Johnston,
supra note 2, at 190–91 (commending this theory).
17. See Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity
to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 978–82 (2010).
18. Other scholars have also advocated for the consideration of correctional conditions in
sentencing. See Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal Guidelines
World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 741–42 (2006) (suggesting that courts consider women’s heath
issues in sentencing); Ken Strutin, The Realignment of Incarcerative Punishment: Sentencing
Reform and the Conditions of Confinement, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1313, 1357–71 (2012)
(suggesting that sentencing courts be permitted to consider the humaneness of treatment in prison
under an Eighth Amendment analysis); cf. Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66
VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2013) (arguing that, “once we understand punishment severity in terms
of harsh treatment rather than a more neatly bordered but inaccurate construct like days in prison,
we must consider the actual amount of harsh treatment we inflict,” which will vary by an inmate’s
facility and how he experiences that facility, among other factors); Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth
Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from Proportionality
Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 85–86 (2009) (suggesting that the partial unification of the
proportionality and conditions of confinement analyses under the Eighth Amendment could result
in constitutional conditions of confinement that vary by offenders’ crimes and characteristics).
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For clarity of analysis, this Article limits its attention to defendants with
clinical syndromes, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major
depression, which cause extreme distress and interfere with social and emotional
adjustment.19 Although other risk factors exist and merit recognition,20 major
mental disorders pose unique difficulties within a prison environment. First,
individuals with serious mental illnesses face the threat of declining cognitive
function, which—because it implicates a person’s hold on reality, personality,
and autonomy—constitutes a particularly grave danger. Second, mental
disorder is often difficult to diagnose, and the screening systems that prison
intake centers use overlook some disorders, which leads to a delay in treatment
and possible placement in an unsuitable environment.21 Other vulnerabilities,
such as physical disability, diminutive stature, and first-offender status, may be
easier to identify (and harder to feign).22 Third, prisons commonly protect
offenders susceptible to abuse by placing them in protective custody or solitary
confinement, but the prolonged confinement of a mentally disordered offender
in isolated and extremely restrictive conditions may result in severe
psychological damage.23 Thus, to the extent that isolation constitutes a prison’s
primary protective mechanism, prisons may lack a means of protecting
vulnerable, disordered offenders without further endangering their health.
Judges may be able to compensate partially for these deficiencies through
sentencing.
To be clear, this Article does not advocate for the full judicial assumption of
responsibility for evaluating and placing mentally ill inmates in appropriate
facilities, or for a diminution of correctional responsibility in these areas.
Indeed, prisons are well positioned for, and should accelerate their progress in,
developing and implementing objective, verified, reliable classification
procedures and humane housing and treatment options for mentally ill
offenders.24 Rather, the Article merely examines whether a judge should be
19. The fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders characterizes these disorders as Axis I disorders. See AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 13–24, 28
(4th ed. rev. 2000). The fifth, current edition of the DSM eliminates the Axis system. See AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 16–17
(5th ed. 2013) [herinafter DSM-5]. This Article uses serious mental illness, major mental illness,
and major mental disorder interchangeably and mental illness and mental disorder as shorthand for
these serious conditions. A disordered individual is assumed to have one of these conditions.
20. See supra note 1 (detailing risk factors).
21. See infra Part I.B. (discussing the shortcomings of prison mental illness evaluations).
22. This observation does not apply to all vulnerabilities, such as gay or bisexual orientation.
See supra note 1 (listing characteristics that contribute to vulnerability in prison).
23. See infra notes 95–97, 103–04 and accompanying text (explaining why disordered
inmates are placed in segregated housing and discussing the effects of isolation).
24. See JAMES AUSTIN & KENNETH MCGINNIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CLASSIFICATION OF
HIGH-RISK AND SPECIAL MANAGEMENT PRISONERS 1 (2004), available at
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authorized to shape the terms of a mentally ill offender’s carceral sentence to
minimize its potential for serious harm.
The adoption of this Article’s proposal would carry three practical effects.
First, it should ameliorate the harsh conditions experienced by a subset of
offenders. Second, it would draw attention to the plight of mentally disordered
prisoners and the insufficient provision of mental health care in prisons and
perhaps spur legislative funding. Third, addressing vulnerability in sentencing
could strengthen inmates’ future Eighth Amendment claims. A judicial
pronouncement that an inmate has a serious mental disorder and requires
treatment or protective resources should help that inmate later establish that
relevant prison officials were aware that certain conditions could pose a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, thus satisfying part of the
“deliberate indifference” standard necessary to prove an Eighth Amendment
violation.25
This Article is organized in four parts. Part I identifies the potential perils that
await offenders with serious mental illnesses in prison, including the
shortcomings in the processes designed to detect offenders’ mental disorders and
to provide them with protective and therapeutic housing. Part II defends the
premise that vulnerability is a legitimate concern for sentencing judges as they
attempt to advance the various goals of punishment. Part III details the current
approaches employed in some jurisdictions to recognize vulnerability in
sentencing and explains why these measures are inadequate. Finally, Part IV
extends these statutory frameworks to the carceral context and argues that judges
should possess the authority to tailor the confinement conditions for vulnerable,
seriously disordered offenders when they believe that a condition is critical to
the humaneness or objectives of an offender’s sentence. Part IV considers steps
judges could take to accommodate this subset of offenders, including mandating
comprehensive mental health examinations, disqualifying facilities particularly
likely to exacerbate an individual’s disorder, designating facilities with certain
treatment or protective options, and directing that offenders receive—or not
receive—certain treatment in prison.
I. IDENTIFICATION AND TREATMENT OF SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES IN
PRISON
Prison is physically and psychologically hazardous for inmates with major
mental disorders. Recognizing the constitutional imperative to identify and treat
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019468.pdf (noting that most prisons have implemented successful
objective classification systems to assign custody levels to inmates).
25. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842–43 (1994) (“Whether a prison official had the
requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual
ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”); infra note 134
(delineating standard for Eighth Amendment violation for condition of confinement).
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these offenders,26 prisons have established procedures to detect serious mental
health issues at intake and to factor an inmate’s mental health needs into his
facility and housing placements. Shortcomings exist in the current assessment
and classification systems, however, that lead to the under-detection of mental
disorders and unpredictable placement of mentally ill prisoners in protective
housing. In addition, the protective housing options afforded within many
prisons may actually exacerbate mental disorders.
A. Mental Health Screening
Prisons rely on a triage system to identify offenders with mental disorders who
require treatment and special housing.27 The initial mental health screen—
sometimes the only assessment of an inmate’s mental health—is typically part
of the prison intake process.28 The aims of this screen are to detect individuals
with severe mental disorders who need immediate psychiatric attention, prevent
suicide, continue individuals’ psychotropic medications, and identify
individuals with non-acute mental health needs that require further assessment
and treatment.29 In addition, the results of the mental health screen inform an
inmate’s classification, housing, job assignment, programming, and treatment.30
The screen typically consists of a short interview regarding an inmate’s current
symptoms, past psychiatric history, suicide potential, social history, and level of
education.31 The screen may also involve a review of available records and the
administration of specialized instruments or tests.32

26. See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
27. See ALLEN J. BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS, 2000, at 1–2, 5 (2001), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf; see also NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PROVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 2 (2001), available at
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/016724.pdf; Humberto Temporini, Conducting Mental Health
Assessments in Correctional Settings, in HANDBOOK OF CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH, 119,
129–39 (Charles L. Scott ed., 2d ed. 2010). For a description of the initial medical screen conducted
at intake and subsequent medical examination in the federal prison system, see Ellis et al., supra
note 4, at 67.
28. See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 2. For a detailed discussion of the variety of
approaches to the intake process that state correctional agencies employ, see PATRICIA L.
HARDYMAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS (2004), available at
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019033.pdf.
29. See Temporini, supra note 27, at 130, 135.
30. HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 10–11.
31. See id. at 10; Temporini, supra note 27, at 135.
32. See HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 10 (“Generally, the screen consists of a brief
interview by mental health staff. Depending on the results, the mental health staff may complete
one or more psychological tests, such as the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI), the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS).”); see also HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 14.
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If the evaluator believes that an inmate is likely to have one or more
psychiatric disorders, she will refer the inmate to a mental health professional
for further evaluation and testing.33 According to the American Psychiatric
Association’s guidelines, this “second-level triage”34 should take place within
seventy-two hours of referral and consist of a “brief mental health assessment”
tailored to “the particular, suspected level of services needed.”35 Finally, for
inmates with serious treatment needs, a psychiatrist or other appropriately
credentialed mental health professional should perform a comprehensive mental
health evaluation within a time frame appropriate to the offender’s level of
urgency.36 This thorough evaluation consists of a face-to-face interview and a
review of the inmate’s health care records and collateral information.37 The
evaluation usually concludes with a diagnostic formulation and an initial
treatment plan.38
While inmates who screen positive for mental disorder will undergo
additional assessment, few safety nets exist for prisoners whose mental health
problems are not recognized or cognizable at the initial screening point.39 Legal
commentators have urged prisons to conduct a subsequent screen to identify
inmates whose disorders were not initially detected or who have developed
mental health problems during the course of their confinement.40 However,
prisons typically do not conduct a second screen for all inmates,41 but instead
rely on post-classification referrals to detect mental health disorders that
manifest after admission.42 Regrettably, anecdotal evidence suggests that the

33. HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 10; HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 14; NAT’L INST.
supra note 27, at 2; Temporini, supra note 27, at 135–36.
34. Temporini, supra note 27, at 139.
35. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS 43–44 (2d ed.
2000).
36. Id. at 44.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 102 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf
(“In many prisons, there is no routine monitoring of [the] mental health of prisoners who are not
on [the] mental health caseload, even when the prisoners are in notoriously stressful settings such
as segregation that can prompt mental health crises.”).
40. See, e.g., Bonnie J. Sultan, The Insanity of Incarceration and the Maddening Reentry
Process: A Call for Change and Justice for Males with Mental Illness in United States Prisons, 13
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 357, 374 (2006) (advocating for making treatment options
available to inmates who develop mental illnesses while in prison).
41. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 101–02; Temporini, supra note 27, at
137–38.
42. See Temporini, supra note 27, at 137–38.
OF CORR.,
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referral process is woefully deficient43 because seriously ill inmates often fail to
self-report.44 Further, correctional officers tend to misinterpret symptomatic
illness as disorderly conduct, and thus only report inmates who pose security
threats.45 One court observed that “custody staff essentially make medical
judgments that should be reserved for clinicians, and some inmates are not given
appropriate early treatment that could prevent or alleviate a severe psychiatric
disorder.”46
B. Shortcomings in Initial Screening Procedures
Multiple shortcomings mar correctional agencies’ mental health screening
processes. Some deficiencies involve failures in implementation, while other
problems are structural in nature.
First, while the vast majority of prison facilities report administering mental
health screens within a day of admission,47 they do not necessarily do so in a
comprehensive manner or under conditions likely to generate accurate results.
For instance, in Coleman v. Wilson, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California found that the California Department of Corrections’s
mental health screening processes “are either used haphazardly, or depend for
efficacy on incomplete or non-existent medical records, self-reporting, or the
observations of custodial staff inadequately trained in the signs and symptoms
of mental illness.”48 According to the court, thousands of inmates suffer from

43. See, e.g., Richard L. Elliott, Evaluating the Quality of Correctional Mental Health
Services: An Approach to Surveying a Correctional Mental Health System, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
427, 435 (1997); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 101.
44. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that an
individual’s mental illness may affect his ability to recognize his disorder or seek assistance).
45. See Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 396–97 (2006) (explaining that correctional officers often cannot
distinguish between the actions of a disgruntled inmate and a mentally ill inmate); see also HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 75–76; W. David Ball, Mentally Ill Prisoners in the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: Strategies for Improving Treatment and Reducing
Recidivism, 24 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 16–17 (2007); Johnston, supra note 2, at
169–74.
46. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1219.
47. See JAMES AUSTIN & KENNETH MCGINNIS, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., CLASSIFICATION OF
HIGH-RISK AND SPECIAL MANAGEMENT PRISONERS 45 (2004), available at
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019468.pdf; HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 10. The Bureau
of Justice Statistics found that maximum and medium security facilities were more likely than
minimum security facilities to screen inmates at intake and conduct psychiatric assessments. See
BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 2 tbl.2. (finding that minimum security facilities conducted
psychiatric assessments approximately sixty-two percent of the time, compared to eighty-four
percent at medium security facilities and approximately eighty-eight percent at maximum security
facilities).
48. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1305–06 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
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undetected or untreated mental illnesses.49 In 2005, despite a court order
directing the Department to improve the assessment process,50 the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California concluded that the state’s prisoner
intake system “fails to adequately identify and treat the health care problems of
new prisoners.”51 The court observed that intake evaluators typically
administered health screens in less than half of the amount of adequate time
(seven minutes instead of fifteen minutes).52 Perhaps even more egregiously,
screeners sometimes assessed inmates in groups, without regard to their
confidentiality or unwillingness to share sensitive information in a group
setting.53
Second, the quality of screening instruments varies among facilities.54
Federal reports warn that some prison facilities administer incomprehensive
tests that have neither been verified nor tested on representative prisoner
populations.55 A 2007 report by the U.S. Department of Justice’s National
Institute of Justice observed that “screening procedures are highly variable; they
may consist of anything from one or two questions about previous treatment to
a detailed, structured mental status examination.”56 Additional studies show that
the brief screening tests developed specifically for correctional settings fail to
identify one out of every four offenders with a previously undetected mental
disorder.57 Other tests may yield even less impressive results.58
Third, limitations inherent to the assessment process inhibit evaluators’
abilities to accurately detect inmates with mental health needs. Initial mental
health assessments may rely almost exclusively on information the inmate

49. Id. at 1306.
50. See id. at 1323–24.
51. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
3, 2005). For an analysis of this case and deficiencies in California prisons’ assessment processes,
see Ball, supra note 45, at 7–10.
52. Plata, 2005 WL 2932253, at *12 (assessing the constitutional sufficiency of all health
screens conducted at California prisons, not just mental health assessments).
53. Id. at *13.
54. See HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 14 (recognizing that, although mental health screening
is a legal and practical necessity, “[d]etermining how to screen and the methods to use remains
challenging”).
55. See, e.g., HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 14.
56. JULIAN FORD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH SCREENS FOR
CORRECTIONS 1–2 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/216152.pdf.
57. Temporini, supra note 27, at 132 (reporting that standardized screening methods, such as
the Correctional Mental Health Screen and the Brief Jail Mental Health Screen, are approximately
seventy-five percent effective at accurately identifying individuals with previously undetected
mental disorders).
58. See, e.g., Linda A. Teplin, Detecting Disorder: The Treatment of Mental Illness Among
Jail Detainees, 58 J. OF CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 233 (1990) (finding that 62.5% of
inmates with acute mental illnesses were missed by routine screening and not treated).
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communicates to the evaluator through speech or behavior.59 However, inmates
with serious mental disorders may be unwilling or unable to communicate
accurate information about their mental health status or history. Many inmates
are aware that individuals who manifest bizarre thoughts or behavior may face
adverse consequences, such as being placed on suicide watch, sent to
administrative lockdown, forcibly administered medication, or preyed upon by
other inmates.60 In addition, an inmate’s mental illness, low intelligence, mental
retardation, or lack of verbal skills may hamper his ability to communicate his
symptoms effectively.61 Moreover, inmates who lack access to the psychiatric
medication necessary to enable ordered thought or effective communication may
not be able to remember or convey relevant information.62 Experts warn that
evaluators may misinterpret an inmate’s inability to communicate as intentional
malingering or an attempt to be manipulative.63 In addition, anosognosia, or
refusal to acknowledge one’s disorder,64 is a common symptom of some serious
mental illnesses,65 and inmates may go to great lengths to hide their maladies as
a manifestation of their disorders.66 Finally, co-occurring substance abuse
disorders, head injuries, and developmental disorders can complicate diagnoses
and treatment.67 In this setting, accurate detection of mental disorder may
depend upon an evaluator’s level of training. However, mental health
professionals with extensive training in assessment and diagnosis, such as
psychologists and psychiatrists, rarely conduct mental health screenings.
Instead, the screens are often performed more economically—and perhaps less
effectively68—by nurses, counselors, or social workers.69
Finally, intake evaluators often lack access to records or reports that could
provide a more accurate picture of an inmate’s mental health status. Evaluators

59. See Ball, supra note 45, at 8 (observing that mental health screens in California prisons
“fail to incorporate objective factors alongside self-reporting”).
60. HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 14–15.
61. See id. at 15; Ball, supra note 45, at 8.
62. See Ball, supra note 45, at 7–8.
63. HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 15.
64. VESNA MILDNER, THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION 253
(2008).
65. See, e.g., E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE 112 (2012) (noting that
approximately half of all individuals with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder have impaired
awareness of their illness).
66. HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 5; Anosognosia Keeps Patients From Realizing They’re Ill,
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Sept. 7, 2001), http://journals.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle
.aspx?articleid=103404.
67. See HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.
68. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“The [medical technical
assistants] who briefly screen incoming inmates typically do not have the necessary training and
background to recognize psychiatric illnesses.”).
69. NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 27, at 3.
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commonly do not have the results of prior psychiatric evaluations, even those
conducted in connection with a competency examination, insanity proceeding,
or pretrial detention.70 Inmates usually do not bring medication containers,
prescriptions, or copies of their medical records to a diagnostic center.71 In
addition, mental health screens are often uninformed by jail evaluation and
treatment records, even though state law may require that these records
accompany an inmate upon transfer.72 An evaluator may even complete an
initial assessment and classification without access to a presentence report.73
Without this data, screeners must rely on inmates’ willingness and ability to
share information about their mental health. Consequently, prisoners’ mental
disorders can go undetected.74
C. Treatment, Housing, and Vulnerability
Even when evaluators do detect a mental disorder, prisons often fail to provide
the treatment and the protective environment necessary to prevent disordered
offenders from experiencing serious harm. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to reasonably adequate
medical care.75 Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue,
circuit courts of appeals have extended this holding to psychiatric and
psychological care.76 In Ruiz v. Estelle, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas outlined six guidelines that correctional institutions must meet
to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.77 Under these guidelines, prisons must
maintain a systematic screening and evaluation program to identify inmates who
70. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 101. Electronic record-keeping may
ameliorate this critical deficiency.
71. See Ball, supra note 45, at 7; Temporini, supra note 27, at 133–34.
72. See Ball, supra note 45, at 7.
73. HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 13 (observing that, while “[i]nformation typically
contained in a presentence investigation report is critical to conducting a comprehensive and
complete initial assessment[,] . . . [m]any states reported . . . that these data are not received in a
timely manner and sometimes arrive after the prisoner has been transferred from the intake facility
to another prison”).
74. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 6, at 9 (reporting that, although most prisons provide
mental health services, only thirty-four percent of state prisoners and twenty-four percent of federal
prisoners who had a mental health problem actually received mental health treatment after
admission).
75. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989) (recognizing that prisoners have a right to health care
under both the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause).
76. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47–48 (4th Cir. 1977); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (“[T]he State is under a duty to provide [an individual with mental retardation
involuntarily confined to a mental institution] with such training as an appropriate professional
would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from
bodily restraints.”).
77. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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require mental health treatment, provide treatment beyond segregation or close
supervision, employ a sufficient number of trained mental health professionals
for individualized treatment, keep accurate and confidential records, properly
administer medications, and identify and treat inmates at risk for suicide.78
Several courts and correctional organizations have embraced the Ruiz criteria as
the standard for constitutionally adequate mental health care in correctional
settings.79
Prisons generally apply the principle of least eligibility, deliberately
maintaining the level of health care a step below the services that the government
provides to the non-incarcerated population that relies on public assistance.80
Under this principle, “the level of prison conditions should always compare
unfavorably to the material living standards of the laboring poor,”81 because
prisoners “are the least eligible or least deserving members of society for any
free benefit from the government.”82 Given their cost, older psychiatric
medications—which often have more side effects and lower rates of compliance
than newer medications—are the treatment modality of choice inside prisons.83
Additionally, although the vast majority of prisons report providing some form
of psychotherapy or counseling,84 they must limit their distribution of this

78. Id.
79. See Fred Cohen, Legal Issues and the Mentally Disordered Inmate, in NAT’L INST. OF
CORR., SOURCE BOOK ON THE MENTALLY DISORDERED PRISONER 32, 48 (1985); Kim P. Turner,
Raising the Bars: A Comparative Look at Treatment Standards for Mentally Ill Prisoners in the
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 424 & n.66
(2008).
80. FRANK SCHMALLEGER & JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY
205 (2001).
81. Richard Sparks, Penal “Austerity”: The Doctrine of Less Eligibility Reborn?, in PRISONS
2000, at 74 (R. Matthews & P. Francis eds., 1996).
82. Brandon K. Applegate, Penal Austerity: Perceived Utility, Desert, and Public Attitudes
Toward Prison Amenities, 25 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 256 (2001).
83. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 115–17, 121–25 (detailing the limited
access to newer medications within some prison systems and examining the side effects of older
antipsychotic medications, which some prisons fail to appropriately monitor);
Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 6, at 922; see also NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 27, at 4
(reporting that all forty-nine departments of corrections responding to the survey treat mentally ill
inmates with psychotropic medication).
84. See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 2 tbl.1 (reporting that eighty-four percent of
state adult confinement facilities provide therapy).
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expensive service.85 Consequently, many inmates do not receive the therapy
that they need to cope effectively in prison.86
The default rule within many state correctional agencies, as well as the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, is to house inmates with major mental disorders within the
general prison population at the appropriate security level.87 Inspired by the
ideals epitomized in the Americans with Disabilities Act,88 these jurisdictions
“mainstream” inmates with serious mental illnesses.89 Theoretically, this
housing arrangement could facilitate equality of opportunity, full participation
in programs, and independent living for disordered individuals.90 However,
because the general prison environment is antitherapeutic, this approach has
engendered criticism.91
85. See NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 27, at 4–5 (reporting that fourteen departments of
corrections typically provide inmates with non-acute mental illnesses with less than one hour per
week of counseling, ten departments typically provide these inmates with one hour of counseling
per week, four departments provide more than one hour of counseling per week, and nine
departments provide therapy based on an individual prisoner’s need).
86. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 109–14 (detailing the limited provision of
therapeutic interventions in many prison systems); Sally J. MacKain & Charles E. Messer, Ending
the Inmate Shuffle: An Intermediate Care Program for Inmates with a Chronic Mental Illness, 4 J.
FORENSIC PYSCHOL. PRAC. 87, 89 (2004) (observing that “few inmates receive care beyond the
prescriptions of medication or assignments to separate housing”).
87. See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 1, 4; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
39, at 128. For a detailed examination of placement decisions and treatment afforded in U.S.
prisons, see ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 28–29.
88. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
89. See Fellner, supra note 45, at 394 (“Apart from the mental health services that may or
may not be provided, prisons typically treat prisoners with mental illness identically to all other
inmates. There are no special allowances. Officials confine them in the same facilities, expect them
to follow the same routines, and require them to comply with the same rules.”); see also U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Institution Management of Mentally Ill Inmates § 6, at 3
(Program
Statement
5310.13)
(1995),
available
at
http://www.bop.
gov/policy/progstat/5310_013.pdf (“To ensure consistent treatment throughout the system, each
institution shall develop a comprehensive approach for managing mentally ill inmates which
emphasizes the management of these cases in a regular correctional setting, rather than in a
hospitalized setting, as the preferred treatment strategy whenever and wherever feasible.”).
90. See Judy Anderson, Special Needs Offenders, in PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION 219,
220 (Peter M. Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett eds., 1999).
91. See, e.g., CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., MENTAL HEALTH IN THE HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS 43
(2004), available at http://www.correctionalassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2004/06/Mental
-Health.pdf (identifying “the overarching problem with the provision of mental health care in New
York State prisons [as] the attempt of [the Office of Mental Health] to superimpose the community
mental health model on the correctional system” and arguing that this model is inapt because “in
the correctional system . . . not only is outpatient care sorely lacking in ‘the community’ of the
general prison population, the violence and chaos of prison life itself can destabilize even mentally
balanced individuals”); Shelia M. B. Holton, Managing and Treating Mentally Disordered
Offenders in Jails and Prisons, in CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH HANDBOOK 101, 109–10
(Thomas J. Fagan & Robert K. Ax eds., 2003) (arguing that mentally ill inmates in a mainstreamed
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Confinement within the general prison population can be seriously damaging
for an inmate with a major mental disorder.92 As a preliminary matter, this highstress environment exacerbates the symptoms of many serious mental illnesses
and can cause cognitive degeneration.93 Moreover, recent studies demonstrate
that individuals with serious mental illnesses, unable to sufficiently assess
danger and modify their behavior to ward off attacks, are more prone to physical
and sexual victimization than non-disordered individuals.94 In addition, strict
compliance with prison rules can be difficult for individuals with mental and
behavioral limitations, and prisoners with serious mental illnesses are more
likely than non-disordered prisoners to violate prison rules.95 As a result,
mentally ill prisoners are disproportionately punished in solitary confinement,96
where they may be especially susceptible to decompensation, psychotic break,
and suicide ideation.97

environment are likely to isolate themselves through withdrawal and enter the cycle of segregation);
cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 133 (discussing why deinstitutionalization and the
community mental health model are problematic in the prison context).
92. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 53; Marshall T. Bewley & Robert D.
Morgan, A National Survey of Mental Health Services Available to Offenders with Mental Illness:
Who is Doing What?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 351, 352 (2010); Richard C. McCorkle, Gender,
Psychopathology, and Institutional Behavior: A Comparison of Male and Female Mentally Ill
Prison Inmates, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. 53, 54 (1995).
93. See Jamie Fellner, A Conundrum for Corrections, A Tragedy for Prisoners: Prisons as
Facilities for the Mentally Ill, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 135, 139–40 (2006) (explaining that the
general prison environment can worsen a mental illness to the point at which hospitalization is
necessary); Holton, supra note 91, at 108–10.
94. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 161–69 & nn.64–83, 91–103 (physical and sexual assault);
ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS
REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–12, at 24–25, 27–29 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri1112.pdf (sexual victimization).
95. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 170–74 nn.114–34 (citing several studies reporting that
mentally disordered inmates have trouble following prison rules).
96. See id. at 174–76 & nn.146–49. A 2004 report by the National Institute of Corrections
found that forty-seven percent of states reported subjecting disruptive mentally ill inmates to the
same maximum-custody policies as non-disordered inmates. AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47,
at 37.
97. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 176–78 & nn.150–55. Conversely, a recent study led in
part by the Colorado Department of Corrections concluded that confinement in administrative
segregation does not induce significant cognitive or psychological decline in inmates with or
without pre-existing mental disorders. See Maureen O’Keefe et al., A Longitudinal Study of
Administrative Segregation, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 49, 54–59 (2013). However, other
researchers have identified a number of methodological flaws in the study. See Stuart Grassian,
“Fatal Flaws” in the Colorado Solitary Confinement Study, SOLITARY WATCH (Nov. 15, 2010),
http://solitarywatch.com/2010/11/15/fatal-flaws-in-the-colorado-solitary-confinement-study/.
More research is necessary to determine how variations in conditions of confinement
—such as the physical layout of cells, access to personal effects, and programming opportunities—
may affect the mental health of prisoners with and without preexisting serious mental illness. See
Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 6, at 921; Carl B. Clements et al., Systemic Issues and
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Because seriously disordered offenders are particularly vulnerable to
predation, prisons may house these inmates in isolation as a means of protection.
Through a process called external classification, correctional authorities—based
largely on information collected at intake—determine a prisoner’s custody level
(minimum, medium, or maximum) and his facility placement.98 Once the
prisoner is placed in a facility, correctional officials typically undertake the
process of internal classification, which determines the appropriate housing for
an individual of a particular custody level and the programming and resources
he requires.99 Although aspects of inmate classification have become
increasingly objective over time,100 facilities still base protective custody
decisions on the subjective judgments of correctional officials.101 Prison
classification experts recognize that these subjective assessments may yield
arbitrary determinations with tragic results.102 Ironically, the housing
arrangement designed to protect vulnerable inmates from general-population
predators may introduce a different, but equally significant, danger. Protective
custody places inmates in highly restrictive housing that resembles disciplinary
isolation, in which offenders are secluded for twenty-one to twenty-four hours

Correctional Outcomes: Expanding the Scope of Correctional Psychology, 34 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 919, 925–26 (2007).
98. AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47, at 7. For an explanation of the Bureau of Prisons’s
designation process, see ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 29–37; see also Fed. Bureau of Prisons, U.S.
Dep’t. of Justice, Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification (2006) (Program
Statement No. 5100.08), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5100_008.pdf
(governing the designation of an inmate to a specific institution).
99. See PATRICIA L. HARDYMAN ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTERNAL PRISON
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS 1–2 (2002), available at http://www.jfa-associates.com/publications
/pcras/05_Internal.pdf.
100. See AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47, at 1.
101. See id. at 7–8; HARDYMAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 11; NAT’L PRISON RAPE
ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 76–77.
102. See, e.g., AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47, at 7–8 (“Unfortunately, professional
judgment has been shown to be by far the least accurate risk assessment method.”); James Austin,
External and Internal Classification, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS PRISON
CLASSIFICATION PEER TRAINING AND STRATEGY SESSION 5, 7 (2001), available at
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/016707.pdf (“Currently, most prisons systems have less structured
internal classification systems which can often result in serious incidents or high-profile escapes.
Often, inmates are inappropriately housed, programmed or improperly separated.”). However,
under the Prison Rape Elimination Act, all facilities must assess prisoners with an objective
screening instrument during an intake screening for their risk of sexual victimization by other
inmates. See 28 C.F.R. § 115.41 (2013). For a description of several actuarial-based risk
assessment instruments, see AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 47, at 15–23.
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per day.103 Evidence suggests that individuals with serious mental disorders
often deteriorate in this restrictive environment.104
If a prisoner reaches a state of crisis or an acute state of mental illness, prison
authorities typically transfer him to an acute crisis unit for inpatient mental
health services.105 Stays in these units are temporary; the goal is to treat and
stabilize the inmate for return to the general population or, perhaps, a residential
treatment unit.106 Criteria for admission match those required for involuntary
civil commitment,107 and treatment resembles that available in an inpatient
psychiatric hospital, with significant psychotherapy and pharmaceutical
regimens.108
In addition, some states house mentally ill inmates in separate units or
facilities for longer periods of time, especially when inmates cannot function
adequately or cope within the general prison population.109 One report, based
on the 2000 Census of State and Federal Adult Correctional Facilities, revealed
the existence of 155 facilities, located in forty-seven states, that provide mental
health or psychiatric confinement as a “special function.”110 Facility
administrators specified that mental health confinement was the primary
function of twelve facilities and a secondary function of 143 facilities.111 While
some states restrict their use of these special accommodations to short-term
103. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 31 (2001);
Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011);
Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and ‘Supermax’ Confinement, 49 CRIME
& DELINQ. 124, 135 (2003); James E. Robertson, The Constitution in Protective Custody: An
Analysis of the Rights of Protective Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 91 (1987).
104. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 176–77.
105. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 41; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39,
at 128.
106. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 128. For more information on residential
treatment units, or intermediate care facilities, see infra Part IV.E.
107. See, e.g., VA. DEP’T OF CORR., OPERATING PROCEDURE 3 (2012), available at
http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/about/procedures/documents/700/730-3.pdf (“Involuntary admission
proceedings shall be initiated when the offender has a mental illness and there exists a substantial
likelihood that, as a result of the mental illness, the offender will, in the near future: (i) Cause
serious physical harm to himself or herself as evidenced by recent behavior causing, or attempting,
or threatening harm and other relevant information or (ii) Cause serious physical harm to others as
evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening harm and other relevant
information or (iii) Suffer serious harm due to his/her lack of capacity to protect himself or herself
from harm or to provide for his/her basic human needs, and (iv) Alternatives to involuntary
admission have been investigated and deemed unsuitable and there is no less restrictive alternative
to such an admission.”).
108. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 128.
109. See NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note 27, at 5–6.
110. BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 2; see also NAT’L INST. OF CORR., supra note
27, at 6–7 (reporting that thirty-three states, the Bureau of Prisons, Puerto Rico, and Guam provide
separate housing units for inmates with mental disorders in at least one institution).
111. BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 4 tbl.5.
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housing for inmates suffering from acute episodes, others report utilizing
facilities as long-term segregated housing for inmates with mental disorders.112
One increasingly popular correctional option involves the use of intermediate
care facilities or residential treatment units, which are designed to assist mentally
disordered inmates who are unable to function adequately in the general prison
population. These units aim to provide prisoners with effective clinical care and
coping skills.113 No recent report catalogues every state that maintains
intermediate care units,114 but research reveals the existence of units in New
York,115 Washington,116 Ohio,117 North Carolina,118 Virginia,119 Kansas,120 New
Mexico,121 Mississippi,122 Vermont,123 Alabama,124 California,125 and
Wyoming.126 These units are associated with lower levels of mental disorder,
disciplinary violations, and victimization, and may yield aggregate cost savings
for prisons.127 Given the widely touted success of these units, other states may

112. Id. at 4; see also Holton, supra note 91, at 115–16 (describing the conditions in mental
health treatment units).
113. See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 4.
114. See 1 NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BERELEASED INMATES xii & xxi n.22 (2002), available at https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/189735.pdf (reporting, based on a 1992 study, that only thirty-six percent
of prisons have specialized housing for inmates with stable mental health conditions).
115. CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 35.
116. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT SERVICES 3 (2008), available at
http://www.doc.wa.gov/aboutdoc/docs/p351gmentalhealthtreatmentservicesfactsheet.pdf.
117. OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT UNITS 2 (2010) [hereinafter
Ohio DRC], available at http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/documents/67-MNH-23.pdf.
118. MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 91–92.
119. VA. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 107, at 3, 5–6.
120. Larned Correctional Mental Health Facility, KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
http://www.doc.ks.gov/facilities/lcmhf (last modified Dec. 7, 2012, 7:55 AM).
121. N.M. CORR. DEP’T, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT CENTER: PSYCHIATRY, MEDICAL,
AND NURSING CARE 2, 4–7 (2012), available at http://corrections.state.nm.us/policies/docs/CD172300.pdf (operating procedure).
122. Terry A. Kupers et al., Beyond Supermax Administrative Segregation: Mississippi’s
Experience Rethinking Prison Classification and Creating Alternative Mental Health Programs,
36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1038 (2009).
123. VT. DEP’T OF CORR., RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS 2 (1997), available at
http://www.doc.state.vt.us/about/policies/rpd/correctional-services-301-550/361-370-programs
-treatment-programs/361.01.09%20Residential%20Tx%20Programs.pdf.
124. ALA. DEP’T OF CORR., TREATMENT PLANNING 4 (2010), available at
http://www.doc.state.al.us/docs/AdminRegs/AR622.pdf.
125. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 131.
126. WIS. DEP’T OF CORR. & DEP’T OF HEALTH SERV., AN EVALUATION: INMATE MENTAL
HEALTH CARE 51–61 (2009), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/09-4full.pdf
(Wisconsin Resource Center).
127. See infra notes 276–80 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of intermediate
care units).
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choose to invest in this mode of treatment to the extent they have not done so
already.128
II. LEGITIMACY OF RECOGNIZING VULNERABILITY AT SENTENCING
Offender vulnerability is an appropriate consideration for sentencing.
Allowing judges to tailor disordered offenders’ prison sentences in light of their
vulnerabilites would enable judges to better fulfill their institutional function and
achieve the goals of punishment.129 A sanction that is appropriate for an
offender without a disability may be wholly excessive, criminogenic, or even
inhumane for an offender lacking the cognitive or behavioral capabilities needed
to cope within a given punitive environment. Traditional theories of punishment
help to justify the consideration of an offender’s susceptibility to serious harm
or need for treatment at sentencing. Although additional justifications may
exist,130 consideration of offender vulnerability may be critical to effectuating
the retributive or rehabilitative purposes of a criminal sentence. Collateral
benefits would attend the accomodation of offender vulnerability as well.
A. Retributive Rationales
Two retributive rationales support the notion that a judge should have the
authority to tailor an offender’s carceral sentence to meet his mental health
treatment needs or to mitigate hardship in prison. First, a retributive
understanding of punishment suggests that a sentencing system should consider
an offender’s vulnerability to avoid imposing an inhumane punishment.

128. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 130 (citing Dr. Jeffrey Metzner as stating
that “Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, New York, Vermont, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, Colorado, and
Kansas have all taken steps towards creating networks of sub-acute care facilities”). Correctional
agencies do not employ consistent terminology for these units, and it can be difficult to discern the
long- or short-term nature of mental health units included in government reports. See NAT’L INST.
OF CORR., supra note 27, at 6–7 (listing ways in which mental health units may be characterized).
Intermediate care facilities are detailed in Part IV.E below.
129. The U.S. Constitution does not assign the sentencing power to one branch of government,
and all three branches may properly play a role in sentencing. See Kieran Riley, Trial By
Legislature: Why Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences Violate the Separation of Powers
Doctrine, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 285, 302 (2010). Sentencing constitutes one of those “zones of
twilight” in which the distribution of power between the separate branches of government overlaps
and is uncertain. See Jordan Fried, Note, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission:
An Analysis of the Role of the Judiciary, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 704, 712–13 (1989) (quoting
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see
also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989).
130. Offender hardship would also factor into utilitarian proportionality conceptions. See, e.g.,
Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:
“Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 592–97 (2005); E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW 161–66
(2009). It could also be relevant to theories of mercy.
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Premised upon respect for the moral dignity and personhood of the offender,131
retributivism will not tolerate punishments that violate human dignity,132 fail to
recognize the personality of offenders,133 or “approximate a system of sheer
terror in which human beings are treated as animals to be intimated and
prodded.”134
Determining when, exactly, a mode of punishment or conditions associated
with a particular sanction cross the line from harsh to inhumane is a difficult
contextual question that ultimately reflects the sensitivities and values of a
particular society.135 While corporal punishment was once commonplace, much
of the civilized world now rejects corporal sanctions, such as whipping and
lashing, as inhumane.136 The same holds true for sanctions intended to
profoundly disrupt one’s personality or senses or to precipitate mental crisis.137
Philosophers, legal scholars, and courts distinguish incarceration from corporal
sanctions by emphasizing the former’s primary function as a deprivation of
131. See BARBARA A. HUDSON, UNDERSTANDING JUSTICE 51 (2003) (characterizing
Immanuel Kant’s moral theory as resting “on a model of the human as someone whose actions are
the result of moral choices”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
217–20, 229–31 (1973) (outlining Immanuel Kant’s theory of punishment, with an emphasis on its
manifestation of respect for dignity, autonomy, rationality, and rights).
132. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 233 (1979).
133. See id. (decrying “a punishment which is in itself degrading, which treats the prisoner as
an animal instead of a human being, which perhaps even is an attempt to reduce him to an animal
or a mere thing” as inconsistent with human dignity).
134. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 488 (1968); see also Markel
& Flanders, supra note 17, at 958 (“To literally or psychologically break or destroy a person under
the aegis of retributive punishment would violate the offender’s dignity, and, in a democracy, our
own.”).
135. See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 123 (1973); David Garland,
Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME & JUST. 115, 143 (1991). This moral question
parallels the legal inquiry of whether punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 838-42 (1994) (holding that, to establish
an Eighth Amendment claim for conditions of confinement, an inmate must demonstrate that the
responsible prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” towards his health or safety by
knowing of the existence of conditions that pose “a substantial risk of serious harm” and failing to
take reasonable measures to abate the risk). Arguably, “retributive theory, with its focus on justice,
morality, and the dignity of the offender can and should be more sensitive to risk of physical and
psychological harm than current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” Johnston, supra note 2, at
213 n.314.
136. See Ruplekha Khullar, Punishment and Human Rights, in APPLIED ETHICS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 183, 187–88 (Shaski Motilal ed., 2010); Garland, supra note 135, at 143.
137. See Hernán Reyes, The Worst Scars Are In the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 591, 594–616 (2007) (defining psychological torture, detailing various methods
of psychological torture, and describing its effects); see also Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner,
Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 104, 104 (2010) (“Solitary confinement is recognized as difficult to
withstand; indeed, psychological stressors such as isolation can be as clinically distressing as
physical torture.”).
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rights.138 However, a sentence of incarceration that carries an unacceptably high
likelihood of victimization or psychological harm for a vulnerable prisoner may
more closely resemble an inhumane corporal penalty than an unobjectionable
deprivation of rights.139 If this is true, then, when the foreseeable risk of serious
physical or psychological harm in prison surpasses an acceptable threshold,
incarceration under a certain set of conditions should no longer be a permissible
punishment option.140 Thus, when a judge believes that incarceration under
standard conditions would pose an unacceptable risk of serious harm to a
particular offender, she should have the authority to select an alternative sanction
of roughly equivalent punitive bite or to modify the conditions of the offender’s
confinement so that incarceration is a morally tolerable option.141
The second justification, as I have argued at length elsewhere, involves the
application of the principle of equal impact.142 Under a just deserts theory, the
severity of an offender’s punishment should reflect his culpability and the harm
that he effected through his criminal act.143 While most scholars measure a
punishment’s severity by reference to an objective standard,144 some
commentators have recognized that sanctions such as incarceration have a
138. See, e.g., J.D. Mabbott, Discussion: Professor Flew on Punishment, 30 PHILOSOPHY 256,
257 (1955); Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1575, 1588–90 (2012) (observing that terms of incarceration will almost always survive
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment); Geoffrey Scarre, Corporal Punishment, 6 ETHICAL
THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 295, 297 (2003).
139. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U
L. REV. 881, 915–16 (2009); cf. Garland, supra note 135, at 149 (“The crucial difference between
corporal punishments that are banned, and other punishments—such as long-term imprisonment
that are routinely used—is not a matter of the intrinsic levels of pain and brutality involved. It is a
matter of the form which that violence takes, and the extent to which it impinges on public
sensibilities.”).
140. Whether an individual’s risk of harm is intolerable will depend on the particularized risk
of serious harm that prison poses to the offender. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 180 (“Statistical
risk alone, however, may not merit a change in sentencing.”); cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical
Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (distinguishing between statistical and
individualized knowledge for purposes of culpability determinations). Individuals with serious
mental illnesses often will be able to prove that they face a particularized risk of serious harm from
incarceration, beyond background statistical rates. In many instances an individualized showing
will be possible given prior patterns of behavior, personal history of abuse, and additional risk
factors that can be brought to a judge’s attention at a sentencing hearing.
141. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 216–21.
142. See id. at 183–229.
143. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING 4–5
(2005); cf. Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1049, 1062–64 (2011)
(distinguishing between harm-based and intent-based means of evaluating an offender’s desert and
asserting that, “[t]o the extent that American sentencing systems are retribution-based, they are
often harm-based systems in a number of respects”).
144. See, e.g., David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1658 & n.195
(2010) (“[R]etributivism defines punishment as a restraint on liberty or other consequence that is
determined and justified objectively by reference to a culpable offense.”).
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foreseeable, disparate impact on vulnerable classes of offenders, such as the
elderly, young, physically disabled, and mentally ill.145 In response, scholars,
including Professors Andrew Ashworth and Andrew von Hirsch, have espoused
a principle of equal impact, which dictates that, “when an offender suffers from
certain handicaps that would make his punishment significantly more onerous,
the sanction should be adjusted in order to avoid its having an undue differential
impact on him.”146 The equal impact principle thus acknowledges the
foreseeable, typical, and serious side-effects that certain penalties hold for
vulnerable populations and seeks to adjust ordered sanctions so that members of
vulnerable classes receive penalties of roughly equivalent severity as nonvulnerable individuals.147 Understood properly, the equal impact principle does
not call for a reduction in punishment, but rather for equalizing the severity of
penalties imposed on equally blameworthy offenders.148 Therefore, recognition
of the equal impact principle may be necessary, at least in extreme cases, to
achieve proportionality in punishment.149

145. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment, and the
Impact of Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY 251, 259–60, 274–75 (Andrew
Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998); Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Young Offenders, in
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 294, 300 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) (describing the
disproportionate effects of punishment on young offenders); VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra
note 143, at 42–43, 172–73, 176 (arguing that incarceration disproportionately affects the young,
disabled, ill, and elderly); Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a
Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 247–48 (2007) (discussing the punishment of
young offenders); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 44
(Haffner Press 1948) (1789) (delineating “circumstances influencing sensibility”).
146. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 143, at 172; see also Ashworth & Player, supra
note 145, at 253 (advocating “a general principle of equal treatment, by which we mean that a
sentencing system should strive to avoid its punishments having an unequal impact on different
offenders or groups of offenders”). The roots of the equal impact theory can be traced to Jeremy
Bentham. See BENTHAM, supra note 145, at 182.
147. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND PENAL POLICY 277 (1983); VON HIRSCH &
ASHWORTH, supra note 143, at 172–73; see also Johnston, supra note 2, at 194–95 & nn.219–23,
221–29; Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 2, at 199–200. This stance may depend upon
subscription to a definition of punishment that includes foreseeable, substantial risks of serious
harm, proximately caused by the state during confinement. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 186–87.
Traditionally, scholars have defined punishment to include only hardships or deprivations that a
legitimate sentencing authority both intends and authorizes. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau,
Feinberg’s Liberal Theory of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 111–12 (2001); Johnston,
supra note 2, at 188 n.198 (collecting sources).
148. See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 143, at 173.
149. See Ashworth & Player, supra note 145, at 255; cf. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra
note 143, at 172 (asserting that, although the “‘equal impact’ principle is connected with the
proportionalist sentencing model, [it] is not part of it in standard cases” and that its use should be
reserved for “unusual cases that diverge significantly from the norm”).
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B. Rehabilitative Rationales
Two strains of rehabilitative thought could also inspire the consideration of
mental disorder and vulnerability at sentencing. The first view echoes the
understanding of punishment dominant in the United States from the World
Wars through the 1970s: the state, through criminal punishment, should seek to
identify and treat the underlying causes of an individual’s criminality.150
Professor Francis Allen described the “rehabilitative ideal” in this way:
It is assumed, first, that human behavior is the product of antecedent
causes. These causes can be identified as part of the physical
universe[,] and it is the obligation of the scientist to discover and to
describe them with all possible exactitude. Knowledge of the
antecedents of human behavior makes possible an approach to the
scientific control of human behavior. Finally, . . . it is assumed that
measures employed to treat the convicted offender should serve a
therapeutic function, that such measures should be designed to effect
changes in the behavior of the convicted person in the interest of his
own happiness, health, and satisfaction and in the interest of social
defense.151
While the rehabilitative ideal did not specify a single theory of crime
causation,152 psychiatrists Karl Menninger153 and Benjamin Karpman,154 among
others,155 embraced a medical model of crime.156 According to this theory,
criminal behavior is symptomatic of mental illness or personality disorder.157 In
essence, offenders are considered “sick” and in need of a state-coerced “cure” to
150. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2 (1981); Richard
C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L. Q.
1205, 1219–20 (1998).
151. Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in
PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 172, 173 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 1973).
152. ALLEN, DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL, supra note 150, at 3.
153. See, e.g., KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 4–5 (1968) (discussing the
“science of criminology”); Karl Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
REHABILITATION, supra note 150, at 132; Karl Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American
Psychiatric Association, 19 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 367, 370–71 (1928)
(detailing several medical and scientific explanations for criminal behavior).
154. See, e.g., BENJAMIN KARPMAN, CASE STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME vii
(1944); BENJAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HIS OFFENSES (1954); Benjamin
Karpman, Criminal Psychodynamics: A Platform, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra
note 150, at 118.
155. See, e.g., BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963) (arguing that the
criminal justice system should serve preventative, not punitive, ends and treat the origins of
criminality).
156. For a description of the tenets and evolution of therapeutic rehabilitation, see E. ROTMAN,
BEYOND PUNISHMENT 60–63 (1990).
157. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Introduction, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note
151, at 1, 5; Karpman, supra note 154, at 119.
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address their underlying sources of criminality.158 Identification and treatment
of an inmate’s mental disorder, under this perspective, may be essential to
restoring the offender to his status as a law-abiding citizen. Evidence suggests,
however, that offenders with major mental disorders often retain the ability to
make rational choices and that their criminal behavior often reflects varying
motivations.159 A less radical and perhaps more defensible view is that the
treatment and control of symptoms associated with mental illnesses are
necessary to allow a disordered individual to benefit from programming, which
has been shown by some studies to hold rehabilitative potential.160
C. Collateral Benefits
Finally, authorizing judges to consider and accommodate offender
vulnerability at sentencing would carry collateral benefits. Expressing concern
for offenders’ actual prison experiences would serve as a means to honor their
personhood and inherent worth.161 Further, permitting judges to acknowledge
and respond to foreseeable, substantial risks of harm would hold prisons
accountable and foster the reform of both prison conditions and correctional
mental health programs.162 Sustained attention to the plight of vulnerable
populations in prison could also increase the demand for alternative sentencing
options, such as home detention with electronic monitoring, halfway houses,
inpatient and outpatient mental health treatment, and mandatory community
service. Many of these noncarceral penalties are much less expensive than
prison and could offer welcome cost savings.163 Finally, by recognizing
vulnerability at sentencing, judges could make the criminal justice system more
just and less cruel.

158. See ROTMAN, supra note 155, at 5.
159. See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519,
558–61 (2012) (discussing social scientists’ views of the varying motivations of offenders with
serious mental illnesses); cf. infra note 237 (citing research suggesting that mental illnesses may
directly contribute to the criminality of only a small minority of the mentally disordered offending
population).
160. See HILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 8 (reviewing the rehabilitative benefits of treating
mentally ill inmates while they are in prison).
161. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 195–97.
162. See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 141 (2006)
(“[T]o the extent that sexual coercion in prison cannot be eliminated, we should make that fact part
of debates about the appropriate use of imprisonment as a penalty.”).
163. See LINH VUONG ET AL., NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, THE
EXTRAVAGANCE OF IMPRISONMENT REVISITED 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.nccd
global.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/specialreport-extravagance.pdf
(analyzing
the
incarcerated populations of four states and the federal prison system to determine the percentage of
non-serious offenders and concluding that imposing non-carceral sentences on these offenders
would yield significant cost savings).
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III. CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS THAT FACTOR VULNERABILITY INTO
SENTENCING
At least two statutory frameworks currently authorize sentencing courts to
consider a disordered offender’s need for treatment and susceptibility to harm in
prison.164 These statutory schemes permit judges to either replace incarceration
with commitment for mental health treatment or treat offender vulnerability as
a mitigating factor weighing in favor of probation or a reduced sentence of
incarceration. The statutes reveal the legislative judgment that sentencing
should reflect a sanction’s foreseeable effects on an offender. They also suggest
that judges are competent to evaluate both an offender’s ability to cope within a
typical prison environment and his likelihood of victimization and mental
degeneration once he is incarcerated.165 While these efforts are important, they
are incomplete and ultimately fail to ensure that vulnerable prisoners receive
proportionate, appropriate, and humane punishments.
A. Authority to Commit Defendants for Treatment
The federal government and a handful of states authorize trial courts to
commit a defendant for mental health treatment in lieu of incarceration in certain
circumstances.166 Critically, these statutes apply to defendants who are
164. The sentencing of juveniles would provide another potential analog. Many states
authorize judges to designate certain offenders below a certain age as “youthful offenders”—a
designation that carries particular placement, programming, and treatment consequences—after
considering their background, maturity, and prospects for rehabilitation in a juvenile facility versus
prison.
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.010(2)(b)(1)–(8), (c) (2008);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-311–16 (2008 & Supp. 2013); West Virginia v. Brewster, 579 S.E.2d 715,
717 (W.Va. 2003) (discussing sentencing under West Virginia’s Young Adult Offenders Act).
165. See infra notes 205–210 and accompanying text (discussing legislative confidence in
judges’ evaluations of criminal defendants).
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-607 (LexisNexis 2013)
(authorizing the court to hospitalize and dismiss the prosecution of a defendant who is “suffering
from mental abnormality and . . . is subject by law to involuntary hospitalization for medical,
psychiatric, or other rehabilitative treatment,” if the court “is of the view that it will substantially
further the rehabilitation of the defendant and will not jeopardize the protection of the public”); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-26(c)(1)-(2) (West 2013) (providing that “[t]he court shall not
impose a sentence of imprisonment upon [an offender rendered fit for trial through the provision of
assistance to compensate for his disabilities] if the court believes that because of his disability a
sentence of imprisonment would not serve the ends of justice and the interests of society and the
offender or that because of his disability a sentence of imprisonment would subject the offender to
excessive hardship” and authorizing hospitalization in lieu of incarceration);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3429 to -3431 (2012) (authorizing a trial court to commit a defendant for
psychiatric care if examination reveals “that the defendant is in need of psychiatric care and
treatment, that such treatment may materially aid in the defendant’s rehabilitation and that the
defendant and society are not likely to be endangered by permitting the defendant to receive such
psychiatric care and treatment, in lieu of confinement or imprisonment”); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-32-02(1)(g) (2012) (authorizing, instead of incarceration, “commitment to an appropriate
licensed public or private institution for treatment of . . . mental disease or defect”); 50 PA. STAT.
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competent to stand trial or plead guilty and to be sentenced. The laws allow
judges to identify defendants whose mental disorders require care outside of
correctional facilities and to guarantee their placement in a suitable hospital or
institution.
For example, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 provides that a trial court prior to sentencing
shall order a hearing, on motion of counsel or sua sponte,167 if it has “reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental
disease or defect for the treatment of which he is in need of custody for care or
treatment in a suitable facility.”168 When the “reasonable cause” standard is met,
the court must order a hearing.169 After the hearing, if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a
mental disease or defect and that he should, in lieu of imprisonment, be
committed to a facility for care or treatment, the court must commit the
defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.170 The Attorney General will
then hospitalize the defendant in a suitable facility.171 This commitment
constitutes a provisional sentence for the maximum term authorized by the
relevant criminal statute, which likely exceeds the sentence the defendant would
have received under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.172 If the defendant
ANN. § 4410(c) (West 2001) (“Upon receipt of a report that the defendant is so mentally disabled
that it is advisable for his welfare or the protection of the community that he be committed to a
facility, the court may so commit him in lieu of sentence for such period, as may be appropriate
until further order of the court; but in no event for a period longer than the maximum sentence
authorized for the crime of which he was adjudged guilty.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-45
(2004) (“If, after hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect and that he should, in lieu of being sentenced to
imprisonment, be committed to a suitable facility for care or treatment, the court shall commit the
defendant to the custody of the Human Services Center.”); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1055 (West
2009) (“When a court intends to commit an offender with a serious and persistent mental
illness . . . to the custody of the commissioner of corrections for imprisonment at a state correctional
facility [for a term of longer than one year], . . . the court, when consistent with public safety, may
instead place the offender on probation or continue the offender’s probation and require as a
condition of the probation that the offender successfully complete an appropriate supervised
alternative living program having a mental health treatment component.”).
167. Either party may file a motion, within ten days of conviction and before sentencing, “if
the motion is supported by substantial information indicating that the defendant may presently be
suffering from a mental disease or defect for the treatment of which he is in need of custody for
care or treatment in a suitable facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 4244(a).
168. Id. Before the hearing, the court may order a psychiatric examination of the defendant
and the filing of a psychiatric report with the court, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 4247(b)
and (c). Id. § 4244(b).
169. See United States v. Chapman, 902 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting 18. U.S.C. § 4244).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d).
171. Id.
172. See id.; see also United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459–60 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(noting that the recommended sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines would be “around one
quarter of the time [the defendant] would receive under section 4244(d)”); United States v. Moses,
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recovers from his mental disorder to the extent that his continued custody in a
mental health facility is unnecessary, but he has not yet served the full length of
his provisional sentence, the court will proceed to traditional sentencing.173
A defendant’s need for treatment, ability to cope within a typical correctional
environment, and susceptibility to harm in prison are all appropriate factors for
a court’s consideration under § 4244. The Fifth Circuit has opined that § 4244
advances several legitimate governmental interests: “(1) protecting mentally ill
prisoners who might be at substantial risk if placed in the general prison
population; (2) ensuring the safety of other inmates; and (3) providing
humanitarian treatment for mentally ill inmates.”174 Other courts have cited
these purposes as animating the statute.175 Accordingly, one forensic
psychology text reflects that “[t]he main issue in [Section 4244] evaluations is
not only the severity of the mental illness from which the defendant suffers, but
also how well the mentally ill defendant can adapt to prison society at a standard
federal prison facility. In essence, it is a question of the fit between the mentally
ill defendant’s needs, the prison’s treatment abilities, and the prisoner’s
perceived coping abilities.”176
The statute anticipates that commitment will only be necessary for a fraction
of offenders with mental disorders.177 For example, a pre-hearing psychiatric or
psychological report may conclude that a particular defendant suffers from a
mental disease or defect “but that it is not such as to require his custody for care
or treatment in a suitable facility.”178 In these cases, the report must include the
expert’s opinion regarding the sentencing alternatives available to the court.179
If the court finds that a disordered offender does not require commitment outside
106 F.3d 1273, 1275 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 892 (4th Cir.
1990).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 4244(e). The defendant will receive credit for time served under his
provisional sentence. See United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1996);
Roberts, 915 F.2d at 892. He will be released “upon expiration of the maximum term that could
have been imposed for the offense of conviction.” See 7A FED. PROC. FORMS § 20:981 (Lawyer’s
Ed., 2012).
174. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d at 165.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Jensen, 639 F.3d 802, 805–06 (8th Cir. 2011); Moses, 106 F.3d
at 1277 n.2; cf. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 245 (1984) (adding the provision “in order to assist the court
in determining the proper facility for commitment of a convicted defendant,” to “benefit . . . a
convicted defendant who is mentally ill and who needs hospitalization,” to “protect[] the public
from mentally ill convicted defendants,” and to “treat[] and hopefully cur[e] such a person”).
176. Daniel A. Krauss & Alan M. Goldstein, The Role of Forensic Mental Health Experts in
Federal Sentencing Proceedings, in FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 359, 377–78 (Alan M. Goldstein ed.,
2007).
177. See United States v. Buker, 902 F.2d 769, 770 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that Congress
did not intend for every mentally ill defendant, without regard to the severity of their illnesses, to
be committed under § 4244).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 4244(b) (2006).
179. Id.
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the prison system, the sentencing judge may recommend the offender’s
placement in a correctional facility capable of providing for his mental health
needs, such as a federal medical facility.180 However, these recommendations
are not binding on correctional authorities,181 and therefore do not ensure that a
vulnerable, disordered prisoner will be housed in a facility with adequate
treatment or protective resources.
Although this type of statute permits judges to commit some disordered
offenders for treatment when confinement in a typical carceral environment
would be intolerably injurious, these statutes are insufficient to protect mentally
ill prisoners. First, they may expose defendants to longer terms of confinement
than would have been probable under sentencing guidelines.182 Second, some
state statutes include a requirement that placement in a mental health institution
must be consistent with public safety, or restrict the application of the statute to
low-level offenders.183 Most importantly, none of these statutes reaches
offenders who could function in a correctional environment with reasonable
accommodations. For these offenders, judges can only recommend correctional
placements, which correctional authorities are free to ignore.184
B. Vulnerability as a Mitigating Factor
A greater number of states designate an offender’s susceptibility to harm in
prison or need for treatment as a mitigating factor at sentencing.185 At least a
dozen jurisdictions recognize excessive offender hardship as a mitigating
factor.186 Many state statutes frame the sentencing factor in general, sourceneutral terms. Arkansas, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey,
North Dakota, and Utah, for instance, authorize judges to consider when
imprisonment would result in “undue” or “excessive” hardship for an

180. See, e.g., Buker, 902 F.2d at 769–70; United States v. Chapman, 902 F.2d 1331, 1333–
34 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gigante, 989 F. Supp. 436, 438, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Krauss
& Goldstein, supra note 176, at 377.
181. See infra note 304 and accompanying text (discussing the frequency with which Federal
Bureau of Prisons officials adopt judicial recommendations).
182. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
183. See HAW. REV. STAT. Ann. § 706-607 (LexisNexis 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-3429 to -3430 (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.1055 (West 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 12.1-32-02(1)(g) (LexisNexis 2012).
184. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 13 (stressing that explicit authorization is most critical in jurisdictions with
determinate sentencing regimes).
186. See infra notes 187–89, 199. In addition, states may have a “catch-all” provision, which
allows courts to mitigate an individual’s sentence when it feels that doing so is necessary for the
ends of justice. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(E)(6) (2012) (providing that the court
shall consider “[a]ny other factor that is relevant to the defendant’s character or background or to
the nature or circumstances of the crime and that the court finds to be mitigating”).
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offender.187 Other states specify that mitigation may be appropriate when the
likely hardship stems from a specific source. One example is Illinois, which
instructs a sentencing judge to consider, as a factor in favor of withholding or
minimizing a sentence of imprisonment, whether “the imprisonment of the
defendant would endanger his or her medical condition.”188 The District of
Columbia, on the other hand, allows a judge to sentence outside the voluntary
sentencing guidelines if she “determines that the defendant, by reason of obvious
and substantial mental or physical impairment or infirmity, cannot be adequately
protected or treated in any available prison facility.”189
In addition, at least a dozen jurisdictions classify an offender’s need for
treatment as a valid consideration at sentencing. Some statutory provisions
simply express concern for a defendant’s need for, and amenability to,

187. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-301(c)(11) (2012) (authorizing the trial court to consider, in
favor of suspension or probation for most criminal offenses, whether “[t]he imprisonment of the
defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or to a dependent of the defendant”);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-621(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) (“The court, in determining whether to
impose a term of probation, shall consider [whether] . . . [t]he imprisonment of the defendant would
entail excessive hardship to the defendant or the defendant’s dependents[.]”); IND. CODE ANN.
35-38-1-7.1(b)(10) (LexisNexis 2012) (“The court may consider the following factors as mitigating
circumstances or as favoring suspending the sentence and imposing probation: . . . Imprisonment
of the person will result in undue hardship to the person or the dependents of the person.”); LA.
CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 894.1.B(31) (2013) (providing that courts, when deciding whether
to suspend a sentence and impose probation, should consider whether “[t]he imprisonment of the
defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents”); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-225(2)(j) (West 2011) (“Prior to sentencing a nonviolent felony offender . . . to a term of
imprisonment in a state prison, the sentencing judge shall take into account
whether: . . . imprisonment of the offender would create an excessive hardship on the offender or
the offender’s family.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(11) (West 2013) (listing, as a criterion for
the appropriateness of imprisonment as a sanction, whether “imprisonment of the defendant would
entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(11) (2012)
(suggesting that the trial court should consider, in deciding whether to order imprisonment, whether
“[t]he imprisonment of the defendant would entail undue hardship to himself or his dependents”);
UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 ADULT SENTENCING AND RELEASE GUIDELINES, at 12–13,
available at http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Guidelines/Adult/2011%20Adult%20Sentencing
%20and%20Release%20Guidelines.pdf (specifying that “[i]mprisonment [that] would entail
excessive hardship on offender or dependents” constitutes a mitigating factor that may “compel
deviation from the guidelines”); see also 9 MINN. PRAC., CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 36:41(F)
(4th ed. 2013) (explaining that, under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines as interpreted through
case law, a judge must consider a dispositional departure at sentencing if the defendant is vulnerable
to victimization in a prison setting). See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at
Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1119–20 & n.284 (2009) (characterizing the hardship of
imprisonment as a mitigating factor that has been considered “particularly powerful in various
jurisdictions”).
188. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-3.1(a)(12) (West 2013).
189. D.C. SENTENCING & CRIM. CODE REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.2.3(8) (2012).
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specialized treatment.190 Other statutes permit the judge to assess implications
for public safety and a treatment program’s likelihood of reducing offender
recidivism.191 Still other statutes direct judges to determine whether a defendant
has a greater need for treatment than carceral punishment.192
190. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth . . . . The court, in determining the
particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed . . . to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)(d)
(West 2012) (treating as a mitigating circumstance when “[t]he defendant requires specialized
treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical
disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-606(2)(d)
(LexisNexis 2012) (requiring the court to consider, when imposing a sentence, the need “[t]o
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.16 (West
2013) (permitting the court discretion to depart from the presumptive sentence range where a
defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of the mitigating factor that
“[t]he defendant has a good treatment prognosis, and a workable treatment plan is available”); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(10) (2012) (providing that, “while not controlling the discretion of the
court” in its decision whether to order imprisonment, it “shall be accorded weight” whether “[t]he
defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(10) (West 2013) (allowing the court, in discerning whether a sentence of
imprisonment is appropriate, to consider the mitigating circumstance of whether “[t]he defendant
is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 7030(a) (2012) (directing the court to consider the defendant’s need for treatment and his “risk to
self” in determining his sentence); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.017(2) (West 2012) (“When a court
makes a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a criminal offense . . . , the court
shall consider . . . [t]he rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”); D.C. SENTENCING & CRIM. CODE
REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.2.3(8) (2013)
(permitting a trial judge to depart from the voluntary sentencing guidelines upon a finding of the
mitigating factor that “the defendant, by reason of obvious and substantial mental or physical
impairment or infirmity, cannot be adequately . . . treated in any available prison facility”); see also
State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (“[A] defendant’s particular amenability to
individualized treatment in a probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a stay of
execution of a presumptively executed sentence.”); infra note 199 (noting possible departures under
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
191. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2523(1) (2012) (“In determining the sentence to be imposed
. . . , if the defendant’s mental condition is a significant factor, the court shall consider such factors
as: (a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill; (b) The degree of illness or defect and
level of functional impairment; (c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation; (d) The
availability of treatment and level of care required; (e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may
create for the public, if at large, or the absence of such risk. . . .”); OR. ADMIN.
R. 213-008-0002(1)(a)(I) (2013) (listing, as a mitigating factor that may be considered in
determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for a departure exist, whether “[t]he
offender is amenable to treatment and an appropriate treatment program is available to which the
offender can be admitted within a reasonable period of time; the treatment program is likely to be
more effective than the presumptive prison term in reducing the risk of offender recidivism; and
the probation sentence will serve community safety interests by promoting offender reformation”).
192. See DEL. SENTENCING ACCOUNTABILITY COMM’N, BENCHBOOK 2013, at 1, 123,
126–27 (2013), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Superior/pdf/benchbook_2013.pdf

2014]

Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing

655

Currently, a judge’s assessment of an offender’s need for treatment and likely
hardship in prison may affect his sentence in one of two ways.193 First, offender
vulnerability may militate towards a suspended sentence of incarceration with
probation.194 For example, the New Jersey statute authorizes judges to consider,
among other mitigating factors, whether “imprisonment of the defendant would
entail excessive hardship to himself” and whether “[t]he defendant is particularly
likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment.”195 Case law suggests
that the mitigating factors typically result in probation only for those offenders
who have limited aggravating factors, have no prior criminal history, or would
otherwise be amenable to probation.196 In states that limit the use of these
mitigating factors to the probation/incarceration calculus, courts lack the means
to mitigate the vulnerability of prisoners who fall outside this narrow band.197

(authorizing the court to depart from the prescribed sentence range when mitigating factor(s) are
found, including whether “the offender is in greater need of an available treatment program than of
punishment through incarceration,” and whether, “before detection, the defendant . . . voluntarily
sought professional help for drug/alcohol treatment, or for any other recognized compulsive
behavioral disorders related to the offense”).
193. In addition, some states permit courts to commit offenders for treatment in lieu of
incarceration. See supra Part III.A.
194. See supra notes 187–92 (citing state statutes that permit the judge to consider the hardship
an offender may experience in prison or his need for treatment).
195. N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:44-1(b)(10)–(11) (West 2013).
196. See, e.g., State v. Evers, 815 A.2d 432, 451–55 (N.J. 2003) (representing that it is only an
“extraordinary or extremely unusual case where the human cost of imprisoning a defendant for the
sake of deterrence constitutes a serious injustice” and reviewing relevant case law); State v. Jarbath,
555 A.2d 559, 561, 569 (N.J. 1989) (finding that the extreme hardship of an offender with mental
retardation, who had suffered almost daily severe abuse in prison and had attempted suicide, and
her likelihood of responding to conditional probationary treatment outweighed the deterrent value
of her carceral sentence, where no aggravating factors applied and the defendant was unlikely to
commit future violent acts); State v. E.R., 641 A.2d 1072, 1073, 1077–78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1994) (approving a probationary sentence upon resentencing for an offender who was
amenable to probation, would suffer extreme hardship in prison, was not at risk of committing
another offense, and was likely to die within a few months from AIDS); see also State v. Wright,
310 N.W.2d 461, 462–63 (Minn. 1981) (upholding the dispositional departure where the defendant
was “more child than man” and would be victimized easily in prison, no appropriate psychiatric
institution was available, the defendant was amenable to individualized treatment in a probationary
setting, and he would pose a minimal threat to society if supervised through out-patient treatment);
State v. Hitz, No. C6-90-1168, 1990 WL 115108, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1990) (affirming
a dispositional departure based on reports that a mentally disordered defendant would become
suicidal in prison and that he was more amenable to probation and treatment than prison); Rachel
Konforty, Efforts to Control Judicial Discretion: The Problem of AIDS and Sentencing, 1998 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 49, 64–65, 92-94 (1998) (describing New Jersey’s statutory framework and its
application within the context of AIDS and HIV).
197. See, e.g., State v. Behl, 573 N.W.2d 711, 713-14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
offender-related factors, such as post-offense conduct and new psychological evidence, may justify
a dispositional departure but not a durational departure, while offense-related factors can support
both dispositional and durational departures).
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Other jurisdictions, including the federal government,198 allow courts to
shorten the prison terms of offenders likely to suffer extreme hardship while
incarcerated.199 These jurisdictions, in effect, allow a sentencing “discount” for
the increased severity of a vulnerable offender’s carceral sentence, as compared
to the anticipated prison experience of a standard offender.200 However, judges
in these jurisdictions cannot tailor the conditions of confinement in order to
reduce a vulnerable offender’s risk of harm. This predicament has led to
charges, such as those raised by Professor Mary Sigler, that reducing an
offender’s prison term on the basis of extreme vulnerability to victimization is
functionally equivalent to sentencing him to a prison term “at rape” or to a term
involving another form of cruelty.201
Although these statutes are preferable to sentencing systems that discourage
judges from modifying presumptive carceral sentences due to their likely
injurious effect, they do not go far enough. Intermediate sanctions such as
weekends in jail and laborious community service may provide appropriate (and
cost-effective) penalties for many offenders.202 However, imprisonment will
likely remain a necessary sanction for the most serious offenses.203 While some

198. See Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of Guideline
Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 571–74 (2006). Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, mental
and emotional conditions are ordinarily irrelevant to the judge’s determination of whether a
sentence should fall outside of the suggested range established by the Guidelines for a criminal
offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (2010). However, under Federal
Sentencing Guidelines section 5H1.3, an offender’s vulnerability due to mental or emotional
conditions may justify a downward departure so long as such conditions “are present to an unusual
degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.” Id. Some courts
have also relied on sections 5K2.0, 5H1.4, and 5K2.13 to grant downward departures on the basis
of suspected or demonstrated hardship in prison. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 181–82 & nn.
172–75.
199. See, e.g., Kern v. State, No. 47A01–0706–CR–277, 2008 WL 1746704, at *2 (Ind. Ct.
App. Apr. 17, 2008) (holding that the trial court afforded sufficient weight to defendant’s back pain
and pleurisy as a mitigating factor when it sentenced her to less than the maximum sentence of
incarceration); Moyer v. State, 796 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the
sentencing court abused its discretion in failing to consider the defendant’s history of lymphoma,
malignancy of the larynx, recurring tumors, pulmonary disease, reliance on a breathing apparatus,
and need for frequent tracheal cleanings and sterile catheters and, consequently, reducing the
defendant’s sentence from forty years in prison to twenty-four years).
200. See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 2, at 201–03.
201. Sigler, supra note 198, at 573.
202. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 127–28 (1996); Robert E. Harlow et al.,
The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining
Community Perceptions, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 71, 72 (1995); Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst
When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO L.J. 949, 996 (2003); supra note 163.
203. Some commentators have opined that incarceration is the only sanction severe enough to
communicate the degree of censure warranted for commission of serious offenses. See, e.g., VON
HIRSCH, supra note 136, at 111; Harlow et al., supra note 202, at 86. In addition, incarceration
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statutes allow a sentencing court to recognize the likely harshness of a vulnerable
offender’s sentence by shortening his term of imprisonment, none grants courts
the authority to ensure that a prison sentence will be carried out under conditions
that are humane and that approximate, as closely as possible, the conditions that
a non-vulnerable person would experience if confined.204 Indeed, the shortened
terms appear to condone the harsher treatment experienced by the vulnerable
inmate.
In jurisdictions that permit judges to weigh vulnerability as a mitigating factor
at sentencing, judges may consider the offender’s need for treatment or the
potential hardships he may face in prison. While existing statutory schemes do
not permit judges to dictate conditions of incarceration, these approaches
demonstrate the legislative judgment that offender vulnerability is a valid and
important sentencing factor. They also establish legislatures’ confidence in
judges’ abilities to accurately and fairly evaluate a defendant’s current mental
health status, future treatment needs, ability to cope within a traditional
correctional environment, and likelihood of experiencing excessive or undue
harm if incarcerated.205
That legislatures entrust judges with these important tasks should not be
surprising, because fact-finding and individualized risk assessment are routine

may be the only sanction likely to serve as an effective general or specific deterrent in specific
instances. See DAVID C. ANDERSON, SENSIBLE JUSTICE 144 (1998).
204. See Bonnie P. Tucker, Deaf Prison Inmates: Time to Be Heard, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1,
14 (1988) (arguing that the solution to the problem of harsher prison experiences of deaf prisoners
“lies in equalizing—to the extent practicable—the conditions of confinement for deaf and hearing
prisoners”).
205. See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 452 F.3d 235, 245–49 (3d Cir. 2005) (observing
that Congress demonstrated its confidence in sentencing judges by requiring the Federal Bureau of
Prisons to consider any court statements regarding the reasoning behind a sentencing
recommendation). This legislative confidence, and judges’ history of sentencing under these
statutes, may offer a partial response to commentators such as Judge Marvin Frankel, who have
questioned judges’ abilities to individualize sentences. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES 12–25 (1972); Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,
4–8 (1972). Frankel criticized judges’ broad sentencing discretion within indeterminate sentencing
schemes, which he characterized as a state of “lawlessness” that afforded the opportunity to express
personal bias and prejudice. See Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, supra, at 6–9. Those concerns
would have less purchase in the context of the reforms suggested by this Article, which would
permit the consideration of offender vulnerability as a sentencing factor, see infra Part IV.A., and
would allow for explicit, reasoned sentencing decisions susceptible to review. But see Michael M.
O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123,
2135–52 (2010) (identifying reasons as to why trial courts may be less inclined to make high
quality, fine-grained sentencing decisions than is often assumed and thus why their decisions may
be less worthy of deference). The fact that the Bureau of Prisons follows most judicial
recommendations suggests the reasonableness and feasibility of judicial suggestions for placement,
programming, and treatment. See infra notes 304–306 and accompanying text.

658

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:625

aspects of judging.206 Crimes typically include a mens rea component, for
instance, and sentencing often involves an assessment of an offender’s
likelihood of recidivism. Judges weigh analogous considerations and engage in
similar fact-finding pursuits when they consider information gathered by
probation staff in presentence reports, adjudicate civil commitment hearings,
quantify future loss, and decide custody cases.207 Moreover, by the time a
mentally disordered offender appears for sentencing, the judge is likely familiar
with his mental health history and status and is therefore in a good position to
structure the sentence to meet his particular needs.208 While correctional
officials will also assess an offender’s mental health and susceptibility to
harm,209 the assessment of a sentencing judge may enjoy a higher likelihood of
accuracy, given a defendant’s rights at sentencing to an attorney’s assistance in
gathering evidence of mental disorder and vulnerability (including medical
records and, potentially, expert opinions), in bringing this information to the
judge’s attention, and in arguing that it warrants mitigation (if supported by
law).210
IV. EXTENSION OF JUDGES’ CONSIDERATION OF VULNERABILITY TO
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
Legislatures typically permit judges to specify conditions of probation but
limit judges to establishing the duration of terms of confinement. A number of
compelling reasons support withholding judicial authority from conditions of
206. See, e.g., CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF THE SCIENCE OF
PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 6, 9 (2011), available at http://www.pretrial.org/download
/risk-assessment/PJI%20State%20of%20the%20Science%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment
%20(2011).pdf; Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk
Assessment in Criminal Justice, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 398 (2005).
207. See, e.g., Kolber, supra note 18, at 1165–66 (discussing various institutional actors’
experiences of measuring the actual or anticipated experiences of offenders and victims). But see
O’Hear, supra note 205, at 2137–40 (arguing that an accumulation of experience does not
necessarily warrant an assumption of competence).
208. Judges have the opportunity to consider and receive information concerning a defendant’s
mental illness at multiple stages in the criminal justice process, including bail determinations,
competency proceedings, and defense to criminal charges. Additionally, many state statutes require
probation officers to include an offender’s mental health history in the presentencing report, and
others permit the inclusion of this information if relevant to the appropriateness of sentencing
options. Johnston, supra note 2, at 159. Judges likely have less information about defendants who
plead guilty than those who go to trial. However, sentencing judges still have the benefit of
presentence reports for defendants who plead guilty. See Gabriel J. Chin, Taking Plea Bargaining
Seriously: Reforming Pre-Sentence Reports After Padilla v. Kentucky, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 61, 63 & n.13 (2011).
209. See supra Part I.
210. See Hessick, supra note 187, at 1101–02 (listing defendants’ rights at sentencing); Alan
C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1787–88 (2003) (exploring which
constitutional trial rights apply at sentencing).
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confinement. As the U.S. Supreme Court stressed in Turner v. Safley, “[r]unning
a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning,
and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province
of the legislative and executive branches of government.”211 Correctional
officials, not judges, have the best sense of available resources, know which
offenders are most in need of these resources, and are best able to track
offenders’ evolving treatment needs. Moreover, judges’ micromanagement of
prison affairs can adversely affect prison security.212
These objections apply, to a varied extent, to all of the reforms proposed
below. However, there are several advantages to the judicial tailoring of
conditions of confinement for vulnerable offenders. First, specific conditions of
confinement may be integral to a judge’s sentencing goals and to the
humaneness of the sentence.213 Legislatures should authorize judges to order
any condition integral to the purpose or legitimacy of a sentence so that they
may fulfill their institutional roles as arbiters of proportional and appropriate
punishment. Second, the pretrial, adjudication, and sentencing processes will
often yield relevant information about offenders’ mental health histories and
needs.214 Allowing this information to factor into placement, programming, and
treatment decisions could result in more appropriate and efficient inmate
designations.
211. 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987); see also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119, 126 (1977) (“Because the realities of running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we
have . . . recognized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded the decisions of prison
administrators.”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (observing that overcoming
the “Herculean obstacles” to effectively maintaining order and discipline, preventing unauthorized
access or escape, and rehabilitating prisoners “require[s] expertise, comprehensive planning, and
the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and
executive branches of government”) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85).
212. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison officials must be free to take
appropriate action to ensure the safety of inmates and corrections personnel and to prevent escape
or unauthorized entry” and therefore should be afforded “wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order
and discipline and to maintain institutional security”); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (“Subjecting the dayto-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper
their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration.”).
213. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Criminal Justice System, Project on Standards Relating to the Legal
Status of Prisoners, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 408–09 (1977) (advocating that, as a means to
ensure that prisoners’ sentences are carried out consistently with the purposes and intents of their
sentences, “[j]udges should not sentence defendants to confinement unless correctional authorities
have certified in writing that facilities, programs, and personnel are available to reasonably carry
out the purpose and intent of each sentence,” and “[s]entencing courts should be authorized . . . to
reduce a sentence or modify its terms whenever the court finds after an open hearing that the
treatment of the prisoner or the conditions under which he lives are not related to the purpose of
the sentence.”).
214. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 158–59.
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Third, judicial input could help to counter the tendency of correctional
officials to prioritize the mental health treatment of prisoners who pose security
threats. Prisons arguably operate under a conflict of interest: they have a moral
and legal obligation to detect and treat inmates’ serious mental disorders, but
under-detecting and under-treating mental illness may conserve valuable
financial, medical, staff, and therapeutic housing resources, at least in the short
term. Indeed, commentators have long complained that correctional officials
tend to overlook the mental disorders of offenders who slip through the mental
health screening process at intake and who do not pose a security threat.215
Fourth, few checks exist to ensure that prison conditions are humane and
appropriate. Prisoners have limited tools with which to demand better
conditions,216 and judges have limited power to alter conditions of confinement
after sentencing.217 Fifth, the public nature of the sentencing proceeding would
impart a degree of transparency and accountability to the assessment and
treatment of seriously disordered prisoners.218 Currently, prisons conduct
mental health and vulnerability assessments behind closed doors, so decisions
regarding assessment, treatment, and housing receive little scrutiny.219
Permitting judges to consider an individual’s mental disorder, treatment needs,
and susceptibility to harm at sentencing would bring these assessments and
underlying prison conditions to light and would subject them to public review
and debate.
Finally, encouraging judges to consult and collaborate with correctional
officials in the reaching and imposing of conditions would help to protect
important correctional interests. Generally, judges should seek input from
affected correctional agencies before ordering any condition that implicates
correctional affairs.220 In addition, though alternative models of judicial
215. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1231–40 (10th Cir. 2005)
(detailing hurdles to inmates’ challenges of federal prison conditions under a variety of theories);
ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 69–70 (discussing the administrative remedy process within the
Federal Bureau of Prisons); Russell, supra note 2, at 808–17 (assessing means of state and federal
offenders to secure adequate care in prison or release from confinement).
217. For thoughtful elucidations of Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims and
available remedies, see Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1380–84 (2008); Reinert, supra note 138, at 1595–1602.
218. See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing
Structures, 64 U. COLO L. REV. 679, 689 (1993) (“[T]he judiciary is the discretionary point that is
most accountable. Compared to any other discretionary point—prosecutors, corrections
administrators, or parole boards—judicial decisions are public, as is the information on which they
base their decisions (open at least to those involved with the case, if not to the public at large).
Judges are expected to provide reasons for their decisions and there is a strong tradition of review
for most decisions—although not for sentencing decisions.”).
219. See supra Part I (discussing aspects of mental health screens, treatment, and housing
decisions in prison).
220. See supra note 213; infra note 254.
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authority are possible,221 allowing the government to move to reopen a sentence
if it believes that an ordered condition is inappropriate, unreasonable, or
infeasible would allow for judicial reconsideration of those conditions that create
security risks, are unnecessary in light of an offender’s evolving mental health
needs, or are impracticable due to resource constraints.
A. Permissive or Mandatory Sentencing Factor
Legislatures seeking to give greater sentencing discretion to judges must
determine whether the consideration of mentally disordered offenders’
vulnerability should be mandatory or permissive. A legislature could dictate that
judges must consider certain offenders’ vulnerability and take necessary actions
to ensure humane, proportionate, and appropriate punishment. Alternatively, a
legislature could authorize judges to consider offender vulnerability and take
necessary actions to prevent foreseeable and substantial harm.
The statutory approaches detailed in Part III reflect varying legislative
judgments on this issue. Statutes authorizing judges to commit defendants for
treatment in lieu of incarceration differ both in the extent to which judges must
consider a defendant’s need for treatment and the level of discretion afforded to
judges in choosing whether to commit the offender.222 Similarly, states that
classify vulnerability as a mitigating factor may or may not require judges to
consider vulnerability at sentencing. Some states require courts to consider the
likelihood that an offender will experience undue hardship if incarcerated,223

221. At least two other models are possible for how judges could respond to a finding of
offender vulnerability. First, a judge could order a correctional agency to take some mandatory
action, such as disqualifying a particular facility as a possible housing option. At the other end of
the spectrum, a judge could identify an offender as having a serious mental disorder and likely
vulnerable to harm, and simply order the correctional agency to report back to the judge after intake
with its classification and housing plan for the offender. At this point, the court would have the
option of resentencing the offender if his punishment, in light of the department’s housing and
treatment plan, appears disproportionate, excessive, or otherwise inappropriate. While the first
option would allow for too little input from correctional officials, the latter would provide judges
too little control over those conditions that they feel are necessary, over the length of a prisoner’s
term, for the effectuation of the purposes of punishment or to ensure the humaneness of an
offender’s sentence.
222. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4244(a), (d) (2006), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-45 (2004)
(directing the court to consider a defendant’s mental health status and need for commitment and
mandating commitment if he meets certain criteria), with HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-607
(LexisNexis 2007); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-26(c) (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-3429, 22-3430 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-02(1)(g) (West 2012); and 50 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 4410(a), (c) (West 2001) (granting discretion to the judge to determine whether to
order a mental examination or hearing and whether to commit the offender).
223. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-301(c)(11) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 706-621(2)(i); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-5-3.1(a)(12); LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
894.1.B(31) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-225(j) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32
-04(11).
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while others treat susceptibility to harm as a permissive sentencing factor.224
Likewise, some states require courts to consider a mentally disordered
offender’s treatment needs at sentencing,225 while others merely permit courts to
do so.226
Vulnerability should at least be a permissive factor at sentencing, and
legislatures that already permit sentencing judges to accommodate vulnerability
should consider extending that authority to conditions of carceral confinement.
While strong arguments support designating offender vulnerability as an
obligatory factor, counterveiling considerations exist. The decision to classify
vulnerability as a permissive or a mandatory sentencing consideration holds
important systemic ramifications.
A number of negative consequences could flow from assigning vulnerability
as a discretionary factor. Permitting judges to disregard vulnerability ensures
disparity in treatment. Some judges will be more interested in recognizing
vulnerability in sentencing than others, and such discretion will allow the
expression of bias or favoritism or otherwise exacerbate discriminatory
tendencies.227 These are not new problems: uneven administration has always
been a hallmark of probation with conditions, and disparate treatment is a feature
of indeterminate sentencing systems and jurisdictions with voluntary sentencing
guidelines.228 Relatedly, designating vulnerability as a discretionary factor

224. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 35-38-1-7.1(b)(10) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:44-1(b)(11) (West 2013); D.C. SENTENCING & CRIM. CODE REVISION COMM’N,
VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5.2.3(8) (2013); UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N,
2011 ADULT SENTENCING AND RELEASE GUIDELINES, at 15, available at
http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Guidelines/Adult/2011%20Adult%20Sentencing%20and%20Rel
ease%20Guidelines.pdf.
225. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-606(2)(d); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-2523; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-04(12); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7030
(2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.017(2) (West 2007).
226. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)(d) (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:44-1(b)(10) (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.16 (West 2011); OR. ADMIN.
R. 213-008-0002(1)(a)(I) (2013); DEL. SENTENCING ACCOUNTABILITY COMM’N, supra note 193,
at 123, 127; DIST. OF COLUMBIA SENTENCING & CRIM. CODE REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5.2.3(8) (2013).
227. See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION 207
(1990) (observing that some judges reserve alternative sentencing options for white, middle- or
upper-class offenders). Thus, the exercise of discretion may exacerbate the unfortunate and
intolerable gap in addressing the mental health needs of whites versus those of African Americans.
See Jennifer M. Keys, When They Need Us Most: The Unaddressed Crisis of Mentally Ill African
American Children in the Juvenile Justice System, 2 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 289, 301–10 (2009)
(discussing racial disparities in recognizing and treating the mental illnesses of juveniles).
228. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 205, at 21–23; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE
23–30 (reprint ed. 1986); Gary L. Mason, Indeterminate Sentencing: Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, or Just Plain Cruel?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 89, 100, 120
n.69 (1990); Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157, 189
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contributes to the uncertainty and opacity of the sentencing process because an
offender will seldom know before sentencing whether the judge will consider
his mental health needs and susceptibility to harm. This type of inconsistency
and lack of transparency currently exist in the federal system as a consequence
of United States v. Booker.229
Conversely, mandating the consideration of disordered offenders’
vulnerability carries both substantial benefits and significant disadvantages.230
In some instances, judges may have more and better information than
correctional officials, and thus may identify some disordered and vulnerable
offenders whom correctional officials may miss.231 Over time, judicial decisions
concerning vulnerability would become more predictable and transparent.
Moreover, treating vulnerability as a mandatory sentencing factor could prompt
legislatures to develop regulatory regimes and allocate resources to aid judges
in the accuracy of their determinations. Upstream and downstream actors would
become attentive to the mental health of offenders as a matter of law.232 For
example, law enforcement would be more likely to note the mental status of a
suspect and to perform some sort of mental health assessment at intake.
Prosecutors would consider the mental health of a defendant and affirmatively
differentiate between prison environments when considering sentencing options.
Defense counsel would also investigate the defendant’s mental health and
vulnerability under various sentencing options,233 and the failure to recognize an

(1986) (“Whenever discretion exists, especially in the difficult and value-laden tasks of sentencing,
vast disparities exist between sentencing decisionmakers.”).
229. 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that mandatory sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional
and, therefore, granting judges greater discretion in sentencing); see Kolber, supra note 2, at
194–95; cf. Raeder, supra note 18, at 741–43 (urging judges to use their discretion under Booker
to consider correctional conditions in sentencing).
230. The observations of, and conversations with, Professors Miriam Baer, Douglas Berman,
Jerold Israel, and Scott Sundby enriched this section.
231. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
232. Training and education would be useful to facilitate the consideration of mental disorder
by actors in criminal justice system. See, e.g., JACKIE MASSARO, GAINS TECHNICAL ASSIST. &
POLICY ANALYSIS CTR. FOR JAIL DIVERSION, OVERVIEW OF THE MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE
SYSTEM FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS 4 (2005), available at http://gains
center.samhsa.gov/pdfs/jail_diversion/MassaroII.pdf (describing the training of police and
correctional officers to identify and respond appropriately to mental health problems); Mental
Health on the Bench: Empowering Judges to Change the Way the Criminal Justice System
Responds to Mental Illness and Substance Abuse, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=CIT&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDispl
ay.cfm&ContentID=148027 (last visited May 15, 2014) (describing training programs on mental
disorders for judges, attorneys, and court personnel). I am grateful to Professors Miriam Baer and
Jennifer Laurin for these points.
233. Expert assistance may be necessary for these assessments, raising important issues under
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77–83 (1985), which held that indigent defendants are entitled to
expert psychiatric assistance when necessary for a fair trial.
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offender’s mental illness and notify the court could serve as the basis for a Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim.234
However, requiring judges to consider an offender’s vulnerability could yield
negative consequences as well. Guaranteeing consideration of vulnerability,
particularly if it would necessitate a hearing, ultimately may not result in
judicially tailored sentences. Instead, a defendant’s right to a hearing, if
waivable, may simply offer another “bargaining chip” for plea negotiations.235
Further, mandatory consideration may result in a more complicated and
expensive sentencing process that requires more preparation time, longer
hearings, and possibly opinions from and examinations of mental health
witnesses. On the other hand, increasing the attention of institutional players to
the existence and plight of mentally ill offenders could result in overall savings
from the diversion of low-level offenders with mental illnesses, higher rates of
plea bargaining, and the increased use of less costly, alternative sanctions.
Moreover, savings may result from reductions in hospital days,236 and possibly
reduced rates of recidivism, 237 resulting from better treatment in prison.
Because this analysis is so complex, further evaluation is necessary before
recommending that legislatures require or merely permit judges to consider
disordered offenders’ vulnerability at sentencing.

234. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203–04 (2001) (holding that the failure by
defense counsel to object to an error of law that could affect sentencing is deficient performance
for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that this deficient performance could suffice
to show prejudice); Hessick, supra note 187, at 1080-86 (examining the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel in mandatory sentencing systems under Glover).
235. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 224–27
(2011); Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 150, 172 (2012) (reflecting that often “new rights have had unintended consequences,
encouraging legislatures to broaden criminal laws and give prosecutors more bargaining chips,
diverting attention from innocence, favoring well-off defendants with well-funded counsel, and
increasing the hydraulic pressures to plead guilty and waive rights”); cf. Talia Fisher, The
Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
943, 944–45 (2007) (observing that many features of the criminal process have turned into
“bargaining chips” and arguing that permitting defendants to waive their rights results in the
efficient resolution of criminal cases and may advance the defendant’s autonomy).
236. See infra notes 276–80 and accompanying text (citing the cost savings resulting from
treatment in intermediate care facilities).
237. See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT 136–38 (2001)
(finding that patients who attended mental health or substance abuse treatment sessions were less
likely to commit violent acts after hospital discharge than those who attended fewer sessions or did
not receive any treatment); Johnston, supra note 159, at 558–61, 566 (reporting that mental illnesses
may directly contribute to the criminality of approximately ten percent of the mentally disordered
offender population and suggesting that treating this population’s mental illnesses and any
co-occurring substance abuse may be effective in reducing recidivism); supra note 160 and
accompanying text.
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The remainder of this Article explores some of the conditions that judges
could order under a procedure allowing a reopening of an offender’s sentence.238
These proposals build upon the statutory frameworks presented in Part III and
extend the principles illustrated there to terms of confinement. The sections
below list possibilities by degree of intrusiveness into correctional affairs and
first profile reforms that would infringe upon correctional affairs the least.
Efficiency benefits and disadvantages associated with each option are explored.
B. Authority to Order Mental Health Evaluations
One way in which judges could improve the prison experiences of vulnerable,
disordered defendants would be to ensure that they receive comprehensive
mental health evaluations by qualified mental health professionals at intake. At
the very least, this requirement would accelerate the timing of the assessment
and eliminate the uncertainty of the screening process.239
Authorizing judges to order a comprehensive mental health examination
would hold a number of benefits, but is not without risk. Its primary benefit
would be to increase the likelihood that vulnerable, disordered offenders would
receive necessary treatment and appropriate housing assignments. Because the
sentencing judge’s assessment of a defendant’s mental health may be more
accurate than an intake evaluator’s assessment,240 allowing a judge to trigger a
comprehensive mental health evaluation could result in a more thorough,
accurate, and efficient correctional evaluation process that identifies a greater
proportion of disordered individuals.241 However, one potential disadvantage of
this option is that judges could order evaluations that ultimately prove to be
unnecessary, resulting in wasted resources. In addition, permitting judges to
order comprehensive evaluations for specific offenders may delay the
assessments of other deserving individuals.
Notably, a judge’s finding of mental disorder could serve as a more
appropriate mechanism for securing the primary benefit of a guilty but mentally
ill verdict. While statutes differ, one common formulation allows a jury to find
a defendant who has asserted an insanity defense “guilty but mentally ill,” thus
exposing him to any sentence appropriate for his offense but specifying the

238. See supra text accompanying note 221.
239. See supra Part I.A–B.
240. See supra note 208 (listing steps in the criminal justice process that allow for the
consideration of a defendant’s mental disorder and observing that judges will likely have less
information about defendants who plead guilty than those who proceed to trial); supra note 210
(listing rights afforded to defendants at sentencing).
241. Intake evaluators typically consider information concerning a defendant’s mental health
history and needs that is included in a presentencing report, and judges can play an important role
in ensuring the completeness and accuracy of this information. Evidence suggests, however, that
intake evaluators may perform evaluations without the benefit of these reports. See supra note 73.
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defendant’s eligibility for mental health treatment while incarcerated.242
Typically, offenders found guilty but mentally ill do not actually obtain better
treatment than other mentally ill prisoners.243 In some states, however, the
verdict has increased offenders’ likelihood of receiving psychiatric evaluations,
thereby improving the odds that their illnesses will be detected and that they will
ultimately receive mental health treatment in prison.244 A judge’s finding at
sentencing could operate in a similar fashion.
Moreover, a sentencing judge’s finding of mental disorder would be more
probative, and more appropriate, than the finding of mental disorder
communicated through a guilty but mentally ill verdict. Commentators have
criticized these verdicts on the basis that assessments of mental disorder at the
time of the crime are largely irrelevant to a prisoner’s mental health needs during
confinement.245 This objection has less purchase in the context of sentencing,
however, because the sentencing judge’s concerns rightfully extend to an
inmate’s anticipated mental health needs in prison and because this assessment
occurs closer to the time of incarceration.246

242. Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should
Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 494–95 (1985).
243. See Lisa A. Callahan et al., Measuring the Effects of the Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI)
Verdict, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 447, 460 (1992); Ingo Keilitz, Researching and Reforming the
Insanity Defense, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 289, 319 (1987); John Q. La Fond & Mary L. Durham,
Cognitive Dissonance: Have Insanity Defense and Civil Commitment Reforms Made a Difference?,
39 VILL. L. REV. 71, 103 (1994); Slobogin, supra note 242, at 513–14 (identifying legal and fiscal
constraints that minimize differences in the treatment afforded to guilty and guilty but mentally ill
prisoners).
244. Slobogin, supra note 242, at 514 n.95 (observing that, “[i]n many states, guilty but
mentally ill offenders receive post-conviction evaluation more often than do other offenders;
therefore, their treatment needs are more likely to be identified”); see also Keilitz, supra note 244,
at 319 (concluding, based on a review of records from Georgia, Illinois, and Michigan, that at least
ninety percent of guilty but mentally ill inmates received a post-conviction mental health evaluation
and that treatment was recommended in sixty-four to seventy-two percent of those cases).
245. Slobogin, supra note 242, at 518; cf. Mark A. Woodmansee, The Guilty But Mentally Ill
Verdict: Political Expediency at the Expense of Moral Principle, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 341, 385 (1996) (“Although the jury [in a guilty but not mentally ill case] found
evidence of mental illness, this indicates only that the defendant suffered from mental illness at the
time of the offense. Such a determination is not dispositive of whether the defendant should receive
mental health treatment at the time he is sentenced.”).
246. A defendant’s mental disorder may impact sentencing in several ways. For instance, his
mental impairment at the time of the crime may serve as a mitigating factor to the extent that it
reduces his culpability. Conversely, mental illness may aggravate a defendant’s sentence, as
sentencing bodies often assume that mental disorder correlates with dangerousness. See Ellen F.
Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 291, 298–300 (1989) (discussing the use of mental disorder, typically a mitigating factor, as
an aggravating circumstance in capital sentencing).
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C. Authority to Disqualify Certain Facilities
Another option to reduce a vulnerable, disordered prisoner’s risk of harm
would be to authorize judges to disqualify certain facilities for placement. A
judge may find a facility unacceptable for a particular offender for a number of
reasons, including the facility’s thin mental health staffing, inadequate mental
health services,247 lack of specialized housing for individuals with serious but
non-acute mental disorders,248 dearth of protective housing, high rates of
violence, or overcrowding. A facility may also be objectionable because of its
regular practice of disciplining, protecting, or maintaining offenders in
isolation.249 Many prisons place vulnerable inmates in protective custody in
extremely restrictive conditions, which may cause acute psychological
deterioration and distress.250 Offenders with serious mental disorders are both
vulnerable to abuse and likely to experience difficulty complying with prison
rules.251 Thus, disqualifying facilities that respond to these foreseeable
247. See, e.g., BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 27, at 1–2, 5; Ronald W. Manderscheid et al.,
Growth of Mental Health Services in State Correctional Facilities 1988 to 2000, 55 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 869, 871 tbl.1 (2004) (reporting the number and percentage of adult correctional facilities
that provide twenty-four-hour mental health care, therapy, and medication in each state).
248. See infra Part IV.E (discussing the existence of and benefits offered by intermediate care
facilities).
249. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. Several courts have held that the
prolonged isolation of offenders with serious mental illnesses constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. See Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth
Amendment Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with a
Mental Illness, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 25–31 (2012); Johnston, supra note 2, at 178 & n.156.
Many professional organizations now recommend that penal institutions avoid the prolonged
segregation of inmates with serious mental illnesses. See AM. BAR. ASS’N, TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 232.8(a), at 55–56 (3d ed. 2010), (“No prisoner diagnosed with serious mental illness should be placed
in long-term segregated housing.”); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON
SEGREGATION OF PRISONERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 35 (2013), available at
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/MH/Documents/2013_04_AC_06c_APA_ps2012_PrizSeg.pdf
(“Prolonged segregation of adult inmates with serious mental illness, with rare exceptions, should
be avoided due to the potential for harm to such inmates.”); Restricted Housing of Mentally Ill
Inmates,
SOC’Y
OF
CORRECTIONAL
PHYSICIANS
(July
9,
2013),
http://societyofcorrectionalphysicians.org/resources/position-statements/restricted-housing-of
-mentally-ill-inmates (acknowledging “that prolonged segregation of inmates with serious mental
illness, with rare exceptions, violates basic tenets of mental health treatment” and that “[i]nmates
who are seriously mentally ill should be either excluded from prolonged segregation status (i.e.
beyond 4 weeks) or the conditions of their confinement should be modified in a manner that allows
for adequate out-of-cell structured therapeutic activities and adequate time in an appropriately
designed outdoor exercise area”); Solitary Confinement as a Public Health Issue, AM. PUB.
HEALTH ASS’N (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.apha.org/advocacy/policy/policysearch
/default.htm?id=1462 (calling on correctional authorities to “[e]xclude from solitary confinement
prisoners with serious mental illnesses”).
250. See Johnston, supra note 2, at 202 nn.257–59.
251. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
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predicaments in ways that imperil disordered inmates could serve as an
important means to excise those sources of harm most likely to render an
offender’s sentence excessive or inhumane.
However, this option has several practical limitations. While disqualifying a
facility for a given prisoner could, in theory, pose minimal difficulty for a
correctional agency, that outcome would depend upon the number of available
facilities and the security levels present within each one.252 Additionally, ruling
out a particular facility does not guarantee that the offender will be confined in
humane or appropriate conditions. Consequently, whether this method will
actually improve conditions of confinement remains to be seen. Disqualifying
certain facilities could even result in greater hardship for an offender if, for
example, he were placed in a facility farther away from his family or support
network.
D. Authority to Designate Certain Kinds of Facilities
Alternatively, legislatures could grant trial courts the authority to order a
vulnerable, disordered offender to serve—or at least start253—his sentence in a
particular level or kind of facility, such as one with certain mental health,
programming, or protective resources, assuming that a facility within that class
is capable of managing an offender’s security risks.254 For example, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons has designated facilities as CARE Level 1, 2, 3, or 4
institutions.255 Facilities at each level are capable of responding to a different
degree of medical need, either directly or through their proximity to community
medical centers or major regional treatment centers.256 Only Level 4
institutions, which include federal medical centers, supply limited inpatient care
and may offer inpatient mental health units.257 Thus, if Congress were to
sanction this option, a federal judge could require a vulnerable, disordered

252. See infra note 254.
253. See infra text accompanying note 287. Multiple considerations militate toward allowing
prison officials to transfer prisoners among facilities, such as prisoners’ evolving mental health
statuses, the need to protect prisoners from emergent dangers within a particular facility, changes
in prisoners’ security classifications, and institutional priorities and resource needs.
254. See infra notes 271–73 and accompanying text (detailing the benefits of an intermediate
care unit). Before imposing a condition that affects a defendant’s facility or housing placement, a
judge should be aware of an inmate’s likely security level and ensure that correctional officials
anticipate being able to satisfy the condition without unduly compromising the institution’s
legitimate security needs. See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 213, at 408–09. Indeed, experts report
that, when the Federal Bureau of Prisons fails to follow a judicial recommendation regarding inmate
placement, “it is usually because the judge has recommended a facility incompatible with the
defendant’s security level.” ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 26–27.
255. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 102–03.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 102.
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offender to complete at least part of his sentence in a federal medical center with
inpatient mental health services.
This proposal is similar to, but would provide broader authority than that
granted under, 18 U.S.C. § 4244. Section 4244, as discussed in Part III.A,
authorizes a trial court to commit certain mentally disordered offenders for
hospitalization as part of a provisional sentence.258 If a court finds that an
individual has a mental disorder under the first prong of § 4244 but does not
require commitment for treatment under the second prong, it may recommend
his placement in a correctional facility capable of providing a certain level of
mental health treatment.259
The instant proposal would make these
recommendations presumptively binding.260 The approach would also eliminate
a major disadvantage of 18 U.S.C. § 4244: the requirement that judges order
provisional sentences for the maximum statutory term.261
E. Authority to Designate a Particular Facility
Another, more intrusive option would involve authorizing courts to choose
the particular facility in which an offender will begin his sentence, assuming that
the facility is capable of managing his security risk level.262 For example, a
legislature could establish that seriously disordered offenders who would face
unacceptable levels of hardship in a typical prison environment should serve
their sentences in facilities capable of offering an appropriate therapeutic
environment. The legislature could then grant sentencing judges the authority
to identify qualifying individuals and to select available facilities that comply
with this directive. One attractive option for vulnerable, mentally disordered
offenders would be a prison with an intermediate care facility or residential
treatment units. Treatment in these units has been shown to “dramatically
improve the quality of life” of mentally ill inmates who have difficulty coping
with the stresses of prison, especially those who are vulnerable to victimization
or who struggle with medication compliance.263

258. See supra notes 167–79 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements and
application of § 4244).
259. See United States v. Chapman, 902 F.2d 1331, 1333–34 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Gigante, 989 F. Supp. 436, 438, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
260. This placement would be subject to modification by reopening the sentence. See text
accompanying supra note 221.
261. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. Many of the possible objections to allowing
trial courts to designate a type of facility also apply to authorizing judges to assign an offender to a
specific facility. For this reason, the next section will consider objections to both proposals.
262. See supra note 254.
263. Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and
Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 462, 465 (1992).
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Although many commentators have characterized prison as a toxic
environment for individuals with serious mental illnesses,264 an exception seems
to exist for many individuals housed in intermediate care facilities. Intermediate
care facilities, found in an increasing number of states,265 are designed to provide
a stable and therapeutic environment for mentally ill prisoners266 who are unable
to cope effectively in the general prison population but do not require hospitallevel care.267 Modeled on the “therapeutic community” and “therapeutic milieu”
concepts advanced by Professor Hans Toch and his colleagues,268 intermediate
care facilities provide inmates with a therapeutic environment that reduces the
stressors and conditions that cause psychological degeneration and threaten
victimization.269 These programs assume that, although most mental illnesses
cannot be cured, with appropriate treatment mentally ill individuals can cope
with their disorders.270 Many treatment modalities and programming options
are typically available within these units or facilities.271 Through individual or
group therapy, prisoners may learn symptom recognition, anger management,
medical compliance strategies, communication techniques, and vocational

264. See supra note 92.
265. See supra notes 115–26 (listing states with intermediate care facilities).
266. Many intermediate care programs focus on treating prisoners with severe mental illnesses.
See, e.g., Ohio DRC, supra note 117; David Lovell et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Residential Treatment for Prisoners with Mental Illness, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 83, 86 (2001).
Inmates with less serious disorders but significant coping problems are also eligible in some states.
See, e.g., Ohio DRC, supra note 117; Ward S. Condelli et al., Intermediate Care Programs for
Inmates with Psychiatric Disorders, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 63, 67 tbl.2 (1994).
267. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 93, at 35; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 40,
at 130; Ohio DRC, supra note note 118; Va. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 107, at 2; WASH. DEP’T OF
CORR., supra note 115, at 3.
268. See generally THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES IN CORRECTIONS (Hans Toch ed., 1984).
269. Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 86.
270. Id.
271. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 35 (providing group therapy, individual
counseling, and medication); Condelli et al., supra note 266, at 64 (noting that New York’s
intermediate care facilities provide “milieu therapy, individual and group therapy, chemotherapy,
recreation therapy, task and skills training, educational instruction, vocational instruction, and crisis
intervention”); Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 86 (providing psychoeducational classes,
counseling, and medication); see also Kupers et al., supra note 122, at 1042–43 (describing various
programs provided by several different facilities). Intermediate care facilities may be located within
separate correctional mental health facilities or in separate wards or units within individual prisons.
For example, New York operates intermediate beds within eleven of its maximum security prisons.
CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 35. Washington provides residential treatment in three
facilities, including the McNeil State Prison. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 116, at 4. Kansas
maintains a separate mental health facility. See Larned Correctional Mental Health Facility, supra
note 120. Additionally, security levels vary among institutions, and even within individual
programs. See, e.g., Ohio DRC, supra note 117, at 4–5; VT. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 123, at 2;
Kupers et al., supra note 122, at 1042 (describing Mississippi’s program).
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skills.272 Rates of medication compliance are high in intermediate care facilities
as a result of patient education, symptom management, frequent psychiatric
consultations, and the increased privacy and decreased stigma surrounding
psychotropic medication.273 Much like a halfway house or community care
center outside of prison, these units are intended as short- or mid-term safehavens where inmates learn strategies for living in the general prison
population.274
Although programs encourage reentry into the general
population, some administrators allow inmates to remain in residential treatment
units if reentry is not feasible given an inmate’s risk of victimization, self-harm,
or medication noncompliance.275
Several studies demonstrate that treatment in intermediate care facilities
results in lower levels of mental disorder, disciplinary violations, and
victimization, and may yield aggregate cost savings for prisons.276 A study by
Professor David Lovell and his colleagues at the University of Washington
reported:
Inmates [who were treated in the intermediate care facility] were
significantly more stable in terms of psychiatric symptoms when they
left than when they arrived. Inmates had better infraction records and
consumed less of the department’s management resources, . . . and
were able to maintain themselves in [the] general population setting.277
The study also found that inmates consumed fewer prison resources after
completing treatment in the intermediate care program.278 Other studies have
272. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 35; Kupers et al., supra note 122, at
1042–42; Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 86; MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 92, 96.
273. See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 36.
274. Id. at 36–37; VT. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 123, at 2; WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., supra
note 116, at 3; Kupers et al., supra note 122, at 1042–43.
275. Intermediate care programs vary in duration. In Washington, inmates spend a median of
seven months in the McNeil mental health program. Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 88. Prison
rules specify that prisoners may stay a maximum of eighteen months, but staff allow some inmates
to stay longer if they believe no other situation is suitable. Id. at 88–89 In New York, inmates may
stay in intermediate care programs for years, and “many” never leave. CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra
note 91, at 38; see Condelli et al., supra note 266, at 65. In North Carolina, most offenders complete
the Social Skills Training Day Program in six to eight months, but offenders may remain in the
program indefinitely if they are “not yet ready for transfer to a less restrictive environment.”
MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 94.
276. See MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 91–92 (describing studies of the benefits of
intermediate care facilities).
277. Lovell et al., supra note 266, at 100. This study measured the number of disciplinary
infractions that program participants received before and after completion and related that figure to
a cost index. Id. at 90–91.
278. Id. at 95 tbl.4. The finding that intermediate care facilities may convey cost savings might
be counterintuitive because these units typically require more mental health professionals, nurses,
and counselors per inmate than units in the general population. See, e.g., ALA. DEP’T OF CORR.,
supra note 124, at 4 (listing members of an inmate’s treatment team).
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reached similar conclusions.279
Social scientists have speculated that
intermediate care programs may help disordered inmates “generalize the skills
they will need post-release and, therefore, offer promise in reducing stress and
cost in a larger sphere of mental health treatment.”280
These studies suggest that intermediate care facilities and residential treatment
units offer a humane and affordable means of confining vulnerable offenders
with serious mental illnesses.281 Legislatures should consider authorizing judges
to sentence vulnerable, disordered offenders to confinement in a facility with
residential treatment units, assuming that such a placement is consistent with an
offender’s security and management needs.282 While laws in every jurisdiction
currently provide for the treatment of prisoners with serious mental disorders,283
correctional authorities may not transfer an offender to a specialized correctional
facility or mental hospital until an offender is in acute distress.284 Admittedly,
ordering the confinement of an offender in a particular facility with certain
treatment or protective resources would not guarantee access to those services
for the duration of his sentence.285 However, the proximity of these resources
may increase the likelihood that an offender will benefit from them if the need
arises, so long as they are available at the offender’s security level.286 In essence,
it is easier to move an offender within a facility than between facilities, and
authorities may be more likely to use intermediate care if it would not require
transfer to another facility.

279. See, e.g., CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note 91, at 37–39 (finding that intermediate care
programs in New York successfully protected vulnerable prisoners from aggressive inmates and
significantly reduced the rate of disciplinary infractions); Condelli et al., supra note 266, at 67–68
(finding, in an earlier study of New York programs, significant reductions in mental health services
received by program inmates, including crisis care, seclusion, and hospitalization, and reporting
significant reductions in very serious infractions and suicide attempts but not in merely serious
infractions, during the six months after admission to the program); Kupers et al., supra note 122,
at 1046 (finding, in a study of Mississippi’s step-down program, that rates of disciplinary
infractions dropped significantly when inmates entered the program, as compared to rates six
months prior to entry, and remained low six months after the program ended).
280. MacKain & Messer, supra note 86, at 89.
281. See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 254.
283. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 640 (5th ed.
2009).
284. Such a result may follow from application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine. See,
e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“Deprivations of liberty solely because
of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not go beyond what is necessary for their
protection.”).
285. Intermediate care “facilities” are often units within larger facilities. See supra note 271.
286. See Holton, supra note 91, at 105 (observing that “some treatment modalities may not be
available at all security levels, so an inmate may be unable to receive optimal care due to his or her
security rating”).
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A more intrusive option would involve allowing judges to designate initial
presumptive placements in particular units. Permitting a judge to order a
vulnerable, disordered offender to start his carceral term in a residential
treatment unit, for instance, would ensure that he receives a comprehensive
evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment plan. In addition, residing in an
intermediate care facility for a few months would allow the inmate to acclimate
to any new psychotropic medication, receive greater monitoring of his
medication, benefit from individual and group therapy, and develop skills and
strategies for living in the general prison population, such as symptom
recognition, anger management, medical compliance, and interpersonal skills.287
The inmate would thus be better equipped to cope successfully in the general
prison population when (and if) he is transferred out of the unit. The inmate may
also be less likely to fall through the cracks of the prison’s mental health care
docket if his mental health later deteriorates. Because this placement would be
presumptive, the offender could begin his term in another unit if a qualified
mental health professional believes that another environment could satisfy his
treatment and protection needs.288
Despite the benefits of initial placement designation, there are valid objections
to allowing judges to tailor sentences in this way. Placing individuals first in
line for residential treatment slots could result in inequity and a misallocation of
resources because correctional officials may be unable to assign the neediest and
most vulnerable offenders to these units. Judicial placement authority may also
result in designated offenders’ receiving more costly housing than is necessary
given their post-sentencing mental health statuses. However, allowing the
government to move to reopen a sentence if an ordered placement becomes
unnecessary, infeasible, or unreasonable may respond adequately to these
concerns.289
Other objections are more difficult to diffuse. Allowing judges to make
facility designations would impede the ability of correctional authorities to
forecast prison housing and resource needs. Given the number of offenders with
serious mental illnesses entering the prison system,290 permitting judges to order
a subset of these offenders to begin their sentences in residential treatment units
may require an expansion of those units.291 Furthermore, this option would
287. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. Over a third of inmates in North Carolina’s
Social Skills Day Training Program arrive directly after entering the prison system. See MacKain
& Messer, supra note 86, at 93, 96.
288. See text accompanying supra note 221 (describing the proposed process to reopen
sentences).
289. See id.
290. See supra note 6.
291. Many mental health experts, organizations, and advocates have urged states to expand the
number and capacities of intermediate care facilities. See, e.g., CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., supra note
91, at 40; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 133–34; Holton, supra note 91, at 116.
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provide only temporary relief to vulnerable, disordered offenders, since
correctional officials would be free to transfer inmates out of the therapeutic
environments after some period of time.292 As an alternative, legislatures could
authorize judges to order that vulnerable, disordered offenders presumptively
spend the entirety of their carceral terms in protective, therapeutic units, at least
in states in which such a long-term option exists.293 This alternative could be
structured similarly to the commitment measures detailed in Part III.A.
However, judicial decisions pursuant to this authority would compound
forecasting and resource allocation problems.
F. Authority to Mandate Certain Treatment Consequences
A final option would permit courts to attach certain treatment conditions to
the carceral sentences of vulnerable, disordered individuals.294 Under this
proposal, correctional officials would retain authority over housing decisions,
but judicial qualifications could govern the treatment of particular offenders. A
number of conditions are possible. For example, assuming an offender’s mental
health problems continue to merit treatment,295 a judge could order that the
offender receive an individualized treatment plan within a designated period of
time and treatment in accordance with that plan, plus additional treatment as
necessary, over the course of his confinement. The court could require periodic
assessments of the nature and extent of the defendant’s mental illness and
updates regarding his mental health, housing, and treatment.296
Further, to mitigate the risk of serious harm to a disordered prisoner, a judge
could attach additional conditions to his sentencing order. The judge could
direct correctional officials to consider the offender’s mental disorder, and its
possible contribution to a disciplinary violation, in any disciplinary
proceeding.297 A judge could order that, in responding to future rule violations,
292. See supra note 275 (discussing the average length of stay in intermediate care facilities).
293. But see supra note 253 (listing considerations that support maintaining correctional
officials’ abilities to transfer inmates among facilities).
294. See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 213, at 408–09 (outlining practices that would aid judges
in crafting realistic sentences that would achieve their intended purposes).
295. While a court could impose a presumptive need for treatment based on its assessment of
an offender’s current and projected mental health needs, correctional mental health professionals
must assess (and respond to) an offender’s treatment needs over time.
296. In this way, sentencing conditions could mimic the requirements of some guilty but
mentally ill statutes. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2-6 (West 2013).
297. For example, a judge could mandate that a clinician review any disciplinary reports to
discern whether mental disorder contributed to the infraction. Cf. Ball, supra note 45, at 38–39
(noting that, in California, a clinician must review the disciplinary report of every prisoner receiving
mental health treatment to determine whether the prisoner’s mental disorder contributed to the
infraction); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 35, at 26 (discussing the importance of clinical
input in disciplinary issues). Prisons vary in the extent to which they consider mental disorder in
disciplinary proceedings. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 39, at 62–64; Michael Krelstein,
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officials use their best efforts to avoid imposing sanctions, such as prolonged
isolation, likely to exacerbate an offender’s disorder.298 The sentencing order
could provide that, if isolation is deemed necessary, any period spent in
segregation must take place under conditions recommended by the American
Psychiatric Association.299 These conditions include maximal access to
structured, clinically indicated, out-of-cell programming and therapeutic
activities (i.e., mental health/ psychiatric treatment) in appropriate, out-of-cell
programming space, as well as regular, unstructured, out-of-cell recreation.300
Allowing judges to affect correctional placement and treatment conditions,
when those conditions are integral to their sentencing aims or the humaneness
of a punishment, would merely increase the weight given to their current
recommendations. Federal law requires the Bureau of Prisons to consider
judicial recommendations when assigning an offender to a particular facility.301
Evidence demonstrates that federal judges offer recommendations regarding an
offender’s placement, programming, or treatment in over forty percent of cases

The Role of Mental Health in the Inmate Disciplinary Process: A National Survey, 30 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 488, 494 (2002).
298. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (noting that mentally ill prisoners are
disproportionately punished in solitary confinement, where they may be especially susceptible to a
number of ill effects); supra note 249 (observing that some courts have held that the prolonged
isolation of offenders with serious mental illnesses constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and
that some professional organizations recommend that penal institutions avoid prolonged
segregation of inmates with serious mental illnesses).
299. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 249, at 36.
300. Id.
301. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b)(4) (2006) (providing that the Bureau of Prisons, when
designating the place of a prisoner’s imprisonment, must consider “any statement by the court that
imposed the sentence (A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was
determined to be warranted; or (B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as
appropriate”); see also Fed. Bureau of Prisons, supra note 98, at 1, 4 (describing the Bureau’s
placement system, providing guidelines for addressing judicial recommendations, and directing its
designators to “make every effort to accommodate recommendations from the courts”). States also
authorize and afford deference to judicial recommendations. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 4.480.
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involving imprisonment.302 Estimates of accommodation differ,303 but recent
evidence suggests that the Bureau fully or partially accommodates between
sixty-six and seventy-three percent of judicial requests.304 This degree of
deference is telling and reflects, as the Third Circuit has recognized, that
“[j]udges take their sentencing responsibilities very seriously and are familiar
with the various [Bureau of Prisons] institutions and programs. Their
recommendations as to the execution of sentences are carefully thought out and
are important to them.”305 The degree of accommodation also demonstrates that
the Bureau of Prisons usually finds judicial requests to be both reasonable and
feasible to implement.
V. CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION
At sentencing, a judge can often foresee that an individual, because of his
major mental disorder and other vulnerabilities, will experience serious
psychological or physical harm in prison. These harms may include
psychological deterioration and mental distress, attempted suicide, and
victimization by staff or other inmates. In response, some jurisdictions allow a
judge to commit a disordered offender for treatment in lieu of incarceration, and
others designate the defendant’s need for treatment and likely undue hardship in
prison as mitigating factors at sentencing. However, these measures do not go
far enough to protect vulnerable prisoners. To prevent anticipated and unjust
harms, legislatures should authorize judges to tailor the conditions of vulnerable,
302. See Todd Bussert, “Real Time” Designation, Proximity to Home and the Importance of
Judicial Recommendations, FED. PRISON & POST-CONVICTION BLOG (July 12, 2012),
http://www.federalprisonblog.com/2012/07/real-time-designation-proximity-to-home-the
-importance-of-judicial-recommendations.html (reporting that, between June 2011 and March
2012, there were 40,563 judicial recommendations and 94,621 initial designations, meaning that
judges offered recommendations for approximately forty-three percent of sentences during that
period); Sonya Cole & Todd A. Bussert, BOP Presentation at United States Sentencing
Commission’s Annual Federal Sentencing Guidelines Seminar (June 12, 2009), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_Seminar/2009/014a_B
OP_Issues.pdf (noting that requests for specific programming (such as vocational training, drug
abuse treatment, or work assignments), confinement in a specific facility or medical center, and
sentence calculation are common recommendations).
303. See, e.g., ELLIS ET AL., supra note 4, at 27 (citing unspecified Bureau statistics showing
that the Bureau honored about eighty-five percent of judicial recommendations for facility
placements in cases in which the defendant qualified for the recommended institution).
304. See Bussert, supra note 302 (reporting that the Bureau followed or partially followed
sixty-six percent of judicial recommendations made between June 2011 and March 2012); Cole &
Bussert, supra note 302 (reporting that the Bureau completely followed sixty-two percent, and
partially followed eleven percent, of judicial recommendations). Correctional facilities may not
accommodate a judicial request because of conflicts between the recommended facility and the
inmate’s security level, the inmate’s ineligibility for the recommended program, security concerns,
or the unavailability of the requested program at the recommended facility. Cole & Bussert, supra
note 302, at 3.
305. Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 247 (3d Cir. 2005).
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disordered offenders’ sentences when specific conditions of confinement are
integral to the judge’s sentencing aims or the humaneness of the punishment.
Under one possible model, if correctional officials find a condition to be
inappropriate, unnecessary, or infeasible, the government could move to reopen
the sentence.
A number of important practical issues remain for exploration.306 First, these
proposals hold important budgetary implications. Assessment of the costs or
savings associated with allowing judges to tailor offenders’ sentences is
necessary. For instance, judges’ findings of mental disorder and vulnerability
may save money for correctional departments by streamlining their assessment
processes and reducing the need for initial mental health screenings. Moreover,
ensuring that vulnerable, disordered offenders receive adequate treatment and
reside in protective environments may reduce these offenders’ hospitalization
rates, disciplinary infractions, and rates of recidivism upon release.307 Judicially
imposed conditions could also result in fewer suits alleging deprivations of civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Each of these possibilities requires further study.
Second, it is important to assess when formal judicial hearings would be
necessary and what conditions would trigger such hearings. A hearing may be
necessary to discern the degree of a defendant’s mental illness and his level of
vulnerability. In addition, legislatures could require a hearing for any defendant
with a history of institutionalization or in any case in which a claim of mental
illness (such as that relating to incompetency, insanity, or diminished capacity)
was raised during a defendant’s trial or in pretrial proceedings. Furthermore, a
hearing may aid sentencing judges in deciding whether to order conditions
affecting a prisoner’s housing, discipline, or treatment.
Third, legislatures should establish protections to ensure that conditions of
confinement for vulnerable offenders are actually humane and appropriate.308
One possibility is to require defense counsel to monitor the mental health and
conditions of confinement of their vulnerable, disordered clients at regular
intervals. Attorneys possibly could request funds for monitoring under the
Criminal Justice Act.309
Finally, it is vital to consider how defense counsel’s limited resources and
competing strategic considerations may affect the utilization of the measures
proposed in this Article. Defense counsel are often woefully underfunded and
lack access to the investigative and expert resources necessary to prepare

306. This section, in particular, benefited from conversations with participants at the
University of Florida Levin College of Law’s Criminal Justice Center’s Junior Scholars’
Conference.
307. See supra notes 276–80.
308. I am grateful to Professor Douglas Berman for this observation.
309. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (2012) (authorizing reimbursement of reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses necessary to provide an adequate defense for indigent defendants).
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adequate defenses and effective mitigation cases at sentencing.310 Their access
to expert assistance will likely be vital to effect the reforms this Article
proposes.311 Furthermore, while mental disorder is associated with heightened
vulnerability, its potential correlation with increased dangerousness may jsutify
its use as an aggravating factor,312 such that its emphasis creates the risk of a
longer sentence.313 How defense counsel should balance these competing
strategic and moral concerns is an important topic for another day.

310. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s
Broken Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice 36–41 (2004), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sc
laid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf.
311. See supra note 233 (recognizing important issues under Ake v. Oklahoma).
312. For a discussion of the relationship between mental disorder and crime, including crimes
of violence, see Johnston, supra note 159, at 564–75.
313. See, e.g., Berkman, supra note 246, at 299–300 (discussing the use of mental disorder, a
mitigating factor, as an aggravating circumstance in capital sentencing).

